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ADOLESCENT DECISION MAKING AND RISK BEHAVIOR:  
A NEUROBIOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Jennifer M. Wolff, Ph.D. 
University of Nebraska, 2012 
Adviser: Lisa J. Crockett 
In this study, the neurobiological theory of adolescent decision making and risk 
taking and the dual-process decision making theory were tested in a sample of college 
students.  Participants responded to questions in a survey about decision making style, 
socio-emotional processes, cognitive control processes, and deviant peers.  The goals of 
the research were to test the relation between decision making processes (intuitive and 
deliberative) and risk behaviors, to test the potential overlap between intuitive and 
deliberative decision making as described in the more traditional dual-process models 
and the socio-emotional and cognitive control systems of the neurobiological model, and 
to extend the neurobiological model by examining the role of individual and social 
contextual factors in risk behavior.  This research is intended to strengthen, expand, and 
improve our existing knowledge of youth decision making and risk behavior. Results 
showed that cognitive control processes and deliberative decision making were related to 
each other whereas socio-emotional processes and intuitive decision making were not. 
Deliberative decision making was related to risk behaviors whereas intuitive decision 
making was not. Finally, self-regulation and deviant peers moderated the relations 
between some of the socio-emotional or cognitive control constructs and risk behavior.  
Results are discussed in terms of their theoretical and practical implications as well as 
future directions for research.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Adolescents are more likely than older or younger individuals to engage in risky 
behaviors, such as drinking alcohol, taking illegal drugs, having unprotected sex, 
engaging in delinquent activity, and driving recklessly (Arnett, 2000).  Because these 
behaviors can result in injury, arrest, pregnancy, or death, an important task for 
developmental researchers is to understand the mechanisms that contribute to these 
outcomes, which may include biological, cognitive, and psychosocial factors (Kelley, 
Schochet, & Landrey, 2004).  One crucial factor is likely to be the decision making 
process that adolescents use when opportunities for risk behavior arise. Although 
research on predictors and correlates of risk behavior is plentiful (see Jessor, 1998; 
Rivara, Park, & Irwin, 2009), surprisingly little research has addressed the decision 
making process adolescents employ when faced with the opportunity for risk behavior in 
the real world.  The primary goal of this study is to better understand how adolescents 
make decisions to engage in risk behavior and to determine some factors that affect the 
decision making process.   
One promising theoretical model for understanding adolescent risk behavior is a 
neurobiological model which has been developed to explain why adolescents are 
particularly at increased risk of making poor decisions to engage in risk behavior 
(Steinberg, 2007; Steinberg, 2008).  According to this model, there are two brain systems 
developing throughout adolescence which are directly related to risk behavior.  The first 
brain system is the socio-emotional system which is sensitive to social and emotional 
stimuli and has to do with an increase in sensation seeking behaviors that have been 
shown to peak in early-to-middle adolescence (Steinberg, Albert, Banich, Cauffman, 
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Graham, & Woolard, 2008).  The development of the socio-emotional system is 
hypothesized to be related to remodeling of the dopaminergic system in the brain, 
affecting attraction to rewarding and novel stimuli and thus resulting in an increase in 
sensation seeking behavior (Steinberg, 2008).  The other system of the neurobiological 
model is the cognitive control system which involves controlling impulses, planning 
ahead, and other executive functions.  This system is thought to develop linearly 
throughout adolescence and is hypothesized to be related to the development of the 
prefrontal cortex and increased connectivity between cortical and subcortical regions 
(Steinberg, 2008).  Therefore, risk behavior is thought to occur in early to mid 
adolescence because the socio-emotional system is highly developed and potent whereas 
the cognitive control system is not yet sufficiently developed to control impulses of the 
socio-emotional system.  
 There are several advantages of this dual-system neurobiological model over 
traditional models of decision making.  First, it is developmental and explains why risk 
behavior increases in adolescence and tends to decrease in adulthood.  Furthermore, the 
neurobiological model incorporates multiple aspects of adolescent development and risk 
behavior, involving social, emotional, neurological, and cognitive development.  
Specifically, the model addresses changes in salience of peers, emotional volatility often 
experienced in adolescence, brain changes, and the development of increased cognitive 
competency. However, there are also limitations of this model. One major drawback is 
that the model does not account for individual differences in risk behavior other than 
those associated with age.  Much previous research on adolescent risk behavior has found 
several individual and social differences that contribute to risk behavior, including having 
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delinquent friends, poor parenting practices, low self-regulation, and environmental 
context to name a few (Chassin, Hussong, Barrera, Molina, Trim, & Ritter, 2004; 
Farrington, 2004).  The neurobiological model has thus far failed to take into account 
potential individual differences in risk behavior.  Therefore, a second goal of the 
proposed study was to extend this developmental model by examining temperamental 
and social differences in decision making and risk behavior.  
 A third goal was to examine the relationship between decision making and 
constructs that characterize the socio-emotional and cognitive control systems of the 
neurobiological model. Contemporary models of adolescent decision making (dual 
process models) typically involve two processes. The first is an intuitive or experiential 
process, in which decisions are made quickly and without much conscious thought.  This 
is the process by which most decisions are made.  The second process is an analytical or 
deliberative process in which decisions are made consciously and with effort (see 
Kahneman, 2003; Klaczynski, 2005).  Although studied in the lab, these two processes 
have rarely been examined in regard to their relation to adolescent risk behavior in the 
real world.  The proposed research will test this association and also examine potential 
overlap between the constructs in more traditional conceptualizations of dual process 
decision making in adolescence and the constructs involved in the neurobiological model.   
 In summary, there were three primary goals of the research.  First, the relation 
between decision making processes (intuitive and deliberative) and risk behaviors were 
examined.  Second, the potential overlap between intuitive and deliberative decision 
making as described in the more traditional dual-process models and the socioemotional 
and cognitive control systems of the neurobiological model was examined. Finally, the 
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proposed research sought to extend the neurobiological model by examining the role of 
individual and social factors in risk behavior.  This research was intended to strengthen, 
expand, and improve our existing knowledge of adolescent decision making and risk 
behavior. 
 In the following sections, adolescent risk behavior and its correlates are discussed, 
followed by a detailed description of dual-process decision making models.  Then the 
neurobiological model, the basis of the proposed research, is presented and explained 
along with aspects of adolescent brain development that are integral to the 
neurobiological model.  Finally, the individual and social variables that may affect 
(moderate) the relation between decision making and risk behavior are discussed.   
Adolescent and Young Adult Risk Behavior 
Considerable attention has recently been given to the “paradox of adolescent 
health” (Dahl, 2004). Adolescence is a life stage during which individuals are generally 
at their strongest and healthiest, yet, compared to other life stages, they have increased 
morbidity and mortality rates from preventable causes. One explanation of this paradox 
involves adolescents’ propensity for risk-taking. Risk taking can be defined as engaging, 
often impulsively, in behaviors that are high in subjective desirability or excitement but 
which carry the potential for injury or loss (Geier, Terwilliger, Teslovich, Velanova, & 
Lunda, 2010). Adolescents and young adults are more likely than individuals at other life 
stages to engage in behaviors that involve risks, such as drinking alcohol, taking illegal 
drugs, having unprotected sex, engaging in delinquent activity, and reckless driving 
(Arnett, 2000).  For the purposes of this study, risk behaviors include these activities 
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because they put one’s health and safety in danger and tend to incite societal concern for 
the well-being of adolescents.   
Prevalence and Costs of Adolescent Risk Behaviors  
The costs of adolescent and young adult risk behavior are staggering. In 2009 in 
the United States, the majority of all deaths among youth aged 10-24 resulted from 
unnatural causes, often motor-vehicle crashes, which many times involve an intoxicated 
driver (CDC, 2010).  In 2007, there were 3,365 fatal car accidents among individuals 
aged 16-24 involving an intoxicated driver (NHTSA, 2007).  One study found that 
driving after drinking increased markedly from age 19 to age 21, presumably due to 
being able to legally drink in public (Beck, Kasperski, Caldelra, Vincent, O’Grady, & 
Arria, 2010).  Drinking alcohol is relatively common among adolescents and young 
adults. Of the adolescents surveyed in grades 9-12, 72.5% indicated any lifetime alcohol 
use and about 24.2% engaged in current heavy episodic drinking (CDC, 2010).  Over 
40% of college students reported binge drinking in the last two weeks (although results 
vary widely across campuses; Johnston, O’Malley, Bachman, & Schulenberg, 2011).  
Drug and alcohol overdoses contribute to many adolescent deaths and hospitalizations. 
Furthermore, about 26% of high school students currently smoked cigarettes and the 
percentage of smokers increased into the 20s.  Almost 20% of adolescents and 33% of 
college students had used marijuana in the last 30 days (CDC, 2010; Johnston et al., 
2011).  Among college students in particular, there is increased co-occurrence of drinking 
and risky sexual behavior (Cooper, 2002).  Risky sexual behavior is also a prevalent 
problem among young people. In 2009, there were approximately 9.1 million cases of 
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sexually transmitted diseases among youth aged 15-24 (CDC, 2010) and only 56.8% 
reported using contraception (American College Health Association, 2011).     
There are societal costs involved in adolescent risk behaviors.  For instance, in 
2001 underage drinking incurred nearly $70 billion in medical, work loss, lost quality of 
life, and other resource costs (Miller, Levy, Spicer & Taylor, 2006) and teen pregnancy 
incurred over $9 billion in taxpayer’s money (Hoffman, 2006).  Furthermore, in 2005, 
there were 1.7 million juvenile delinquency cases handled in court (Sickmund, 2009). 
Understanding the decision-making processes contributing to these adolescent risk 
behaviors continues to be an important task for developmental researchers, with 
significant implications for practice and social policy. 
Adolescence as a risky period.  During adolescence, there are many changes, 
including physical, cognitive, emotional, and social changes, taking place within and 
among individuals that may be factors in adolescents’ increased proclivity to take risks 
(Steinberg & Cauffman, 1999). For example, during adolescence, it is common to 
become more autonomous from parents, resulting in the opportunity to make more 
decisions independently (e.g., Steinberg, 2001; Byrnes, 2005).  Adolescents also tend to 
become more influenced by peers and to care more about what their friends think 
(Prinstein, Borgers, & Spirito, 2001; Susman, Dent, McAdams, Stacy, Burton, & Flay, 
1994).  Indeed, most risk taking occurs in groups of peers, not independently (see 
Steinberg, 2007) suggesting that friends have a large influence over adolescents’ 
decisions.  Additionally, there are many brain changes occurring that may affect 
adolescents’ decisions and behaviors (Steinberg, 2010a). Taken together, these changes, 
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which are common to adolescence, can lead to potentially dangerous decisions and 
behaviors.   
An interesting question to pose is why do these changes take place in adolescence, 
especially since people take calculated risks throughout adulthood? Evolutionary theory 
may help to explain the purpose of some of the socio-emotional changes that accompany 
the biological changes.  Rewards are objects or events that generate 
approach/consummatory behavior and involve positive or hedonic feelings. Rewards are 
therefore important for survival as they are integral for necessary behaviors, such as 
eating and reproduction (Schultz, 2010).  A unique aspect of adolescence is attainment of 
sexual maturity. Evolutionary theory suggests that sexual promiscuity and competition 
peak in adolescence to help young people determine their own status and desirability as a 
mate and their preferences in a mate while practicing mate attraction tactics (Ellis et al., 
2011; Weisfeld & Coleman, 2005).  Ellis and colleagues (2011) assert that natural 
selection may favor strong emotional and behavioral responses to social stimuli during 
adolescence due to an increase in mating opportunities.  For instance, engaging in daring 
yet dangerous activities in presence of members of the opposite sex may be construed as 
“showing-off” for potential mates. 
Predictors of risk behavior often include social and cognitive factors. Often 
different types of risk behavior tend to have similar risk factors including social (poor 
parenting practices and deviant peer affiliations), cognitive (low IQ), temperamental 
(high impulsivity and poor self-regulation), and economic factors (low quality education 
and poor neighborhood quality) (see Farrington, 2004; Savin-Williams & Diamond, 
2004; Chassin et al., 2004).  Decision making has also been conceived as a potential 
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factor in risk behavior (Reyna & Farley, 2006). However, there is relatively little 
empirical evidence linking decision making to real world adolescent risk behavior. 
Theories of Adolescent Decision Making 
Many models of adolescent development have attempted to explain and describe risk 
behaviors, tapping into various possible contributing factors.  There are also a number of 
models to explain human decision making, including dual-process models of decision 
making.  This study focuses on dual-process models that concentrate on adolescent 
decision making and its relation to risk behavior.  More specifically, the neurobiological 
model of adolescent decision making and risk taking is explained in detail.  The present 
research is designed to strengthen the empirical evidence related to the neurobiological 
model, merge it with other conceptions of dual-process models, and address current 
shortcomings of the model.  
Normative Decision Models  
Normative models of decision making define how people should ideally reason, 
make judgments, and make decisions (Baron, 1994) based on the assumption that an 
optimal decision could be arrived at rationally and mathematically (Miller & Byrnes, 
2001).  Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff (1997) assert that one may be considered a 
competent decision maker if certain abilities are developed. The first ability is 
complexity, which is the ability to consider many elements simultaneously, 
systematically, and exhaustively, allowing integration of the diverse components of a 
decision.  The second ability is thinking about possibilities, being able to think further 
into the future and consider long-term consequences.  The third is solving problems, 
which is generating possible solutions, producing and evaluating decision options.  The 
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fourth is perspective-taking, or relativistic thinking, referring to the ability to recognize 
others’ perspectives, and considering and anticipating their actions and values.  The final 
ability is being able to reflect logically on one’s own decision making process.  
Following from these abilities, decision theory specifies five steps that should be 
involved in competent decision making: (1) Identify the possible options, (2) identify the 
possible consequences of each option, (3) evaluate the desirability of each consequence, 
(4) assess the likelihood of each consequence should each action be taken, and (5) 
combine everything according to a logically defensible “decision rule” (Beyth-Marom & 
Fischhoff, 1997; Baron, 1994; Beyth-Marom, Austin, Fischhoff, Palmgren, & Jacobs-
Quadrel, 1993; Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992).  This type of step approach not only 
describes competent decision making, but can also be a useful framework for analyzing 
developmental differences in decision making capacities (Byrnes, Miller, & Reynolds, 
1999).  For instance, some research has assessed age differences in the ability to identify 
options and consequences of certain behaviors (Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman, 2001). 
Studies have implied that faltering in one or more of the steps just outlined may lead an 
adolescent to make poor decisions, perhaps leading to engaging in health risk behaviors 
(Beyth-Marom, et al., 1993; Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; Fried & Reppucci, 2001). 
Employing this type of step-wise model in decision making is thought to reduce 
impulsive behavior, which is antagonistic to competent decision making (Beyth-Marom, 
Fischhoff, Quadrel, & Furby, 1991; Galotti, 2001; Wills & Stoolmiller, 2002).   
Another step-wise model of competent decision making is the self-regulation 
model developed by Byrnes and colleagues (2005; 2001; 1999).  Competent decision 
making is defined as taking the necessary steps to accomplish a goal, which are: (1) Set a 
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goal, (2) Compile options for completing that goal, (3) Rank-order the options, and (4) 
Select the highest ranked alternative.  This model also specifies that competent decision 
makers use logical strategies, such as gathering information about situations to help them 
make important decisions. For instance, feedback from previous decisions should be 
incorporated into one’s existing knowledge and applied to future decisions.  In a series of 
studies, Byrnes and colleagues (1999) found that, among adolescents, college students, 
and adults, college students learned to make better decisions than adolescents, and 
college students and adults also tended to improve their performance in a decision 
making task more than adolescents after receiving feedback (Byrnes et al., 1999).  This 
suggests that relatively older people compared to adolescents are better at learning from 
their mistakes, incorporating new information, and making more accurate subsequent 
decisions, thus becoming more regulated decision makers.  Although, another study 
showed that an adolescent’s goals may be related to better decision making in certain 
cases (Miller & Byrnes, 2001).  Adolescents who reported that social–relational goals 
were important to them also showed a higher level of decision making competence when 
faced with social-relational decisions and tended to report increased engagement in 
socially competent behavior.  This provides support for the self-regulation model of 
decision making because it suggests that effective decision making is likely to occur 
when adolescents place importance on specific goals, and then engage in decisional 
processes that facilitate the attainment of those goals (Miller & Byrnes, 2001).  
Additionally, this line of research suggests that decision making ability is not necessarily 
a stable trait, but rather it may vary due to the domain of decision involved.  
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 Competent decision making also includes the ability to recognize when a 
decision is important and deserves one’s attention.  An important decision is one that 
involves the potential for losses that are serious and difficult to rectify (Byrnes, 2005).  
When such a decision must be made, one should be more analytical.  In contrast, when 
making an unimportant decision, one should conserve mental energy and rely on a more 
automatic process.  In sum, the use of distinct strategies in decision making and having 
the knowledge of when to engage in these strategies are skills that are developed with age 
and can be in place by early adulthood (Byrnes, 2005).  These skills may be related to the 
development of metacognition, which involves the ability the assess one’s own 
reasoning, track the course of reasoning, and assess what one knows (Klaczynski, 2005). 
Competent decision makers have developed a repertoire of strategies to make decisions 
that will facilitate the attainment of goals (Byrnes, 2005).  An important draw-back of the 
models just presented is that they imply that everyone eventually becomes a competent 
decision maker, capable of drawing on their goals when it is time to make an important 
decision. However, even adults sometimes make poor decisions. 
Dual-Process Models   
Decision making research in the past few decades has provided ample evidence 
that people rarely, if ever, make decisions perfectly rationally (Stanovich & West, 2000).  
For example, recent decision making research has found that people are not risk-neutral, 
meaning they interpret and respond to potential losses and gains differently (Polezzi, 
Sartori, Rumiati, Vidotto, & Daum, 2010). Also, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
demonstrated that people tend to violate assumptions of rationality by demonstrating the 
framing effect in which people make different choices depending on whether a problem 
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is worded in terms of losses or gains.  Clearly, another explanation for decision making 
was needed.  Dual-process models of decision making were developed as an alternative 
to normative models of decision making (e.g., Miller & Byrnes, 2001). Dual-process 
models are meant to describe how people actually make decisions, and these models 
recognize that most decisions are made outside of conscious thought whereas relatively 
few decisions are made with more deliberation and careful analysis (Klaczynski, 2005; 
Kahneman, 2003; Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994).  
The basic tenet of the dual-process models is that there are two processes of 
decision making: deliberative/analytical and intuitive/experiential.  The deliberative 
process involves slower, more effortful, perhaps monitored, computational thinking and 
includes the ability to decontextualize reasoning from problem content.  In other words a 
person who is being deliberative would not allow personal biases, prejudices, or framing 
to influence decisions.  For this system to be activated, an individual needs to be 
motivated to make a decision carefullt and have a favorable disposition regarding 
analytical thought in that instance (Byrnes, 2005; Klaczynski, 2005).  If one is going to 
make a decision using the analytical process, one must feel that the decision is important 
and deserves one’s attention.  The analytical system is also used for evaluating and 
justifying beliefs and decisions as well as setting goals, planning how to achieve them, 
and monitoring the progress towards the goals’ achievement.  The analytical system is 
similar to Byrnes’ self-regulation model of decision making, but dual process models add 
a second and more common decision process. 
The intuitive system is typically fast, automatic, effortless, sometimes emotionally 
charged, highly contextualized, operates in the periphery of awareness, and relies on 
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personal memories (Kahneman, 2003; Klaczynski, 2005).  Decisions are made quickly 
and usually result in an intuition or “gut” feeling (Klaczynski, 2005).  Procedural 
memories and decision heuristics play a role in intuitive processing.  Procedural 
memories are memories of processes that one uses repeatedly (Fiske & Taylor, 2008).  
Decision heuristics are cognitive shortcuts used to make decisions quickly (Marsh, 2002).  
An example of a heuristic is the availability heuristic in which people think something is 
more common than it is because the information is more available.  People who choose 
not to fly because they think plane crashes happen often even though flying is a relatively 
safe way to travel is a example of how the availability heuristic is used to make a 
decision.  Heuristics are very influential in decision making, however, they are not 
always the deciding factor for similar decisions.  New information about different 
outcomes, subtle differences in situations, and internal and external cues that are noticed 
by an individual may be assimilated into existing knowledge (Klaczynski, 2005), 
allowing new heuristics to develop and become available due to more experience with 
choices, outcomes, and consequences of decisions. The intuitive system is the default 
decision making system because it requires less cognitive capacity than effortful thinking 
(Kahneman, 2003; Klaczynski, 2005).  It is also likely that evolutionary pressure favors 
the efficient processing of information (Schultz, 2010), allowing individuals to make 
snap decisions pertinent to survival (e.g., run away from the saber-tooth tiger).  Although 
the intuitive system is the default, the deliberative system is theoretically able to override 
the prepotent responses of the intuitive system when the situation demands (Kokis, 
Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002; Kahneman, 2003; Klaczynski, 2005; De 
Neys, 2006; Stanovich & West, 2000).   
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 Klaczynski (2005) gives the underlying, pervasive assumptions of dual-process 
models: (a) intuitive and analytic processing can occur simultaneously, (b) they develop 
independently, (c) intuitive is the default; and (d) intuitive is predominant over analytic 
processing in a multitude of everyday situations.  Neither process is superior, but rather, 
each may be appropriate for different decisions.  Furthermore, either process can result in 
favorable or unfavorable outcomes.  For instance, relying on the intuitive system may 
result in biases that could lead to incorrect conclusions, resulting in incorrect judgments.  
In other cases, one may come to a perfectly logical conclusion using analytic processing 
and a negative outcome could still occur.  Similarly, someone could make a faulty 
conclusion analytically or intuitively and end up with a positive outcome, perhaps by 
sheer luck.  So we must keep in mind that there is not going to be a “best” way to make 
decisions that always results in good outcomes; rather that, depending on the situation at 
hand, one process may be more appropriate, resulting in favorable outcomes more often. 
There is empirical evidence that the intuitive and deliberative processes develop 
with age (Klaczynski, 2005). Piaget’s stage of formal operations includes the 
development of reasoning and problem solving abilities in adolescence (Inhelder & 
Piaget, 1958) which is demonstrated by abilities to think abstractly and hypothetically.  
Cognitive capacity, metacognitive reasoning, and executive functioning also increase 
with age (Klaczynski, 2005; Kuhn, Katz, & Dean, 2004; Morsanyi & Handley, 2008; 
Steinberg, 2007), leading to heightened ability to be analytical when making decisions. 
Klaczynski and Cottrell (2004) showed that adolescents were better able than children to 
reflect on previous decisions when presented with new problems. Similarly, adults were 
better able to incorporate previous feedback into future decisions (Byrnes et al., 1999).   
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Furthermore, Galotti (2005) showed that as individuals aged from early elementary 
school to late high school, adolescents’ goals increased in complexity, defined as several 
parts or subgoals, difficulty, and controllability.  Another study showed that when asked 
to help peers solve a hypothetical dilemma, adults were more likely than adolescents to 
consider consequences of decisions and to suggest seeking advice (Halpern-Felsher & 
Cauffman, 2001).   
The intuitive system is also developing into and throughout adolescence.  This is 
partly because of personal experience. The more experience one has, the more one relies 
on the judgment and decision heuristics created by those past experiences and the 
consequences of previous decisions.  As children and adolescents age and as their 
heuristics are compiled, their general processing becomes more and more automatic and 
intuitive because they can use heuristics rather than thinking about decision options and 
consequences quite as thoroughly.  Morsanyi and Handley (2008) showed that between 5 
and 11 years of age, children were more likely use heuristics in decisions, such as the 
conjunction fallacy and the sunk cost fallacy.  The conjunction fallacy occurs when 
people think two statements are more likely to be true than one statement. For example, if 
individuals were asked whether Mary, the political science major, is more likely to be a 
teacher or more likely to be a teacher and donate money to political candidates, they may 
be inclined to say that she is more likely to be both a teacher and donate money, however, 
one statement is always more likely to be true than two statements.  The sunk cost fallacy 
occurs when people continue to participate in an activity they are no longer enjoying 
because they have already spent money or time on the activity.  Furthermore, because the 
intuitive process expends little cognitive effort, it is likely to be relied on more and more 
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as the complexity and number of decisions to be made increases (Reyna, Adam, Poirier, 
LeCroy, & Brainerd, 2005; Klaczynski, 2005).   
Theoretically, both systems are eventually fully developed, and by adulthood 
individuals have a repertoire of decision making strategies, allowing flexibility and 
variability in the ways they make decisions and solve problems (Byrnes, 2005).  Ideally, 
adolescents should use their analytical abilities to monitor and evaluate the outcomes of 
their decisions (Klaczynski, 2005), thereby learning when to use each process and 
becoming better decision makers.  However, as suggested by the neurobiological model, 
described later, adolescents are not likely to be deliberating over decisions involving risk 
behaviors.  
In summary, adolescents are thought to be developing both the deliberative and 
intuitive systems of decision making with the ideal end result of being able to use the 
appropriate process depending on the situation.  However, these decision making 
processes have rarely been related to real-world risk behavior.  Some researchers of 
adolescent decision making and risk behavior have attempted to empirically link decision 
making processes with risk behavior, but the empirical studies generally examine 
constructs that affect decision making (e.g., weighing risks and rewards), not decision 
making processes specifically.  
Variations on the dual-process models of risk-taking.  Variations on the 
traditional dual-process theories have been developed to attempt to explain adolescent 
risk behavior.  One is called fuzzy trace theory. According to fuzzy trace theory, instead 
of two distinct processes (analytical and intuitive), there is a continuum ranging from 
verbatim representation to gist representation (Reyna et al., 2005), which means that any 
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decision could be slightly more or less based on verbatim or gist representation.  
Verbatim representation is the precise quantitative recollection of an event (which could 
be the consequence of a previous decision) whereas the gist representation is an 
imprecise, qualitative, categorical form of recollection in which a general sense or 
impression of the event comes to mind, including its emotional meaning (Reyna, 2004; 
Kahneman, 2003).  The proponents of fuzzy trace theory state that the natural habit of the 
mind is to think imprecisely and intuitively about decisions (Reyna et al., 2005), which 
accords with the principle that the intuitive system dominates most decision making.  The 
proponents of this theory argue that gist-based decision making should prevent risk 
behavior.  This is because more mature decision makers do not weigh possible rewards 
and risks or the likelihood of each, but rather think about the possibility of a catastrophe; 
and since there is always the possibility of a catastrophe with risk behavior, the mature 
decision maker will decide not to engage in the behavior (Reyna et al., 2005).  
Furthermore, using verbatim representation and thinking through all possible 
consequences and the likelihood of each could lead an adolescent to rationally make the 
decision to engage in risk behavior because the probability of a catastrophic consequence 
is often relatively low (Reyna, Estrada, DeMarinis, Myers, Stanisz & Mills, 2011; Reyna 
et al., 2005).  For example, in the case of sex education, if adolescents are taught about 
quantitative trade-offs between risks and rewards, an adolescent could come to a logical 
conclusion that the risks are relatively low and the rewards potentially high and could 
ultimately decide to have unsafe sex (Beyth-Marom & Fischoff, 1997).  The extension of 
this theory to practice is that interventions should be designed to present gist-based 
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representations of negative consequences of risk behavior that the adolescent will use 
when making decisions about risk behavior.   
There are some drawbacks to this model.  First, it is only applicable if parents or 
educators are able to instill an “anti-risk” gist in adolescents and then assume that the 
same gist will remain the primary factor of any future decision making and for all 
decisions regarding risk behaviors.  However, adolescents may experiment with drinking, 
drugs, or sex and find that these activities are rewarding and that nothing catastrophic 
happened. This would ruin the “anti-risk” gist, perhaps replacing it with a “pro-risk” gist, 
which would potentially lead to more and varied forms of risk taking.  Second, the model 
does not take peer influences into account.  Although fuzzy trace theory includes the 
influence of emotions, they are not considered in the context of peer influence, which is a 
significant oversight, considering the importance of peer relationships in adolescence (see 
Brown, 2004).   If parents and educators are ingraining the disastrous images of risk 
behavior into adolescents, and then a friend or romantic partner has a different idea, there 
is a possibility that adolescents may align themselves with their peers. Furthermore, 
research on executive function and intelligence has shown relations to more analytical 
processing as well as less risk behavior (Jaccard, Dodge, & Guilamo-Ramos, 2005; Hall, 
Elias & Crossley, 2006), which is contrary to fuzzy trace theory because fuzzy trace 
theory contends that more analytical processing should be related to more risk.  A recent 
study by Reyna and colleagues (2011) suggests that neurobiological and memory (e.g., 
fuzzy trace) models could each explain unique variance in risky decision making – an 
interesting possibility that will be further explored in the discussion.  
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A second dual-process model that attempts to explain adolescent risk behavior is 
the prototype willingness model, which hypothesizes two paths, a reasoned path and a 
social reaction path, which operate simultaneously and may lead to making decisions to 
engage in risk behavior (Gerrard, Gibbons, Stock, Vande Lunde, & Cleveland, 2005; 
Gerrard, Gibbons, Houlihan, Stock, & Pomery, 2008).  The reasoned path is similar to 
deliberative processing in that it involves intentional decision making.  The social 
reaction path implies that risk taking occurs as a response to a specific social situation 
and is not planned. This model introduces important constructs to the decision making 
and risk behavior research, such as behavioral willingness, which suggests that most risk 
behavior is not planned, but rather that adolescents who are more open to engaging in risk 
behavior, are more likely to do so when the opportunity arises. Also, the model 
incorporates the idea of risk prototypes which suggests that adolescents have clear images 
of the type of person who engages in risk behavior and the favorability of that prototype 
is related to engaging in risk behavior.  Thus, according to this model, peer influence is 
an important contributor to decision making about risk behavior because one’s peers 
inform one’s risk prototypes.  A contribution of this model is that individual differences, 
particularly in risk prototypes and behavioral willingness, are highlighted.  However the 
prototype willingness model narrowly defines the problem of risk behavior, taking into 
account only a few aspects of social and cognitive psychology.  It also does not address 
how any of its facets, including the reasoned path, risk willingness, or risk prototypes, 
develop.  In other words, although this model claims to target adolescent risk behavior, it 
does not take developmental issues specific to adolescence into account.   
20 
 
 
 
In summary, risk taking peaks in adolescence and declines thereafter. Cognitive 
abilities as well as reliance on heuristic thinking are developing into and throughout 
adolescence and into adulthood (see Boyer, 2006).  It seems clear that adolescent risk 
behavior cannot be described by decision making abilities alone.    
Neurobiological model.  The neurobiological model developed by Steinberg and 
colleagues (Steinberg, 2007; Steinberg, 2008; Steinberg et al., 2008; Steinberg, 2010b) is 
based on emerging brain development research and research on psychosocial factors.  
The neurobiological model is a different type of dual-process model, but there is overlap 
between this model and the other dual-process models described so far.  The major 
difference between the neurobiological model and other dual-process models is that the 
two systems invoked to explain decision making and risk taking are brain systems 
(Steinberg, 2010a; 2010b; Steinberg, 2007) not specific decision making processes. The 
neurobiological model posits a cognitive control system, which may parallel the analytic 
process, and a socio-emotional system, which may parallel the intuitive process.  The 
components of the cognitive control system involve regulatory functions, such as 
planning, resisting temptation, and self-regulation.  The cognitive control system is 
similar to and augments the analytical system of other dual-process models because it 
involves the ability to deliberate over decisions, think precisely, and also to inhibit 
sensation seeking.  Basically, it helps control the impulses of the socio-emotional system, 
which are related to reward and novelty seeking.   
In contrast to the cognitive control system, the socio-emotional system is quick to 
react, acts without awareness, and is sensitive to rewarding social and emotional stimuli 
(Steinberg, 2007).  This is similar to descriptions of the intuitive decision making 
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process, which operates quickly, outside of awareness, and uses emotional information.  
The systems of the neurobiological model and the processes of dual-process models 
therefore appear to be similar.  Furthermore, the traditional dual-process theory and the 
neurobiological model both suggest that development of the two systems or processes is 
complete when most decisions are made quickly or impulsively, but deliberation and 
control take over when necessary (Klaczynski, 2005; Steinberg, 2008). Having common 
indicators of the processes and common endpoints of development suggests that these 
theories may be complementary.  In other words, each theory may benefit from inclusion 
of the other’s constructs and methods.    
According to the neurobiological model, adolescents are more likely than children 
to take risks because the socio-emotional system develops in early adolescence, around 
age 14 perhaps co-occurring with puberty, when opportunities for risk taking behavior 
also increase. The cognitive control system continues to develop gradually into the early 
to mid-20s.  This mismatch in the developmental timing of the two systems leads to 
increased risk-taking during adolescence, especially in the presence of peers (Gardner & 
Steinberg, 2005; Steinberg, 2008).  In other words, adolescents begin to be especially 
stimulated by rewarding and novel stimuli before their self-regulatory capacities can 
intervene, and increased risk-taking behavior is the result.   
Developmental changes in brain circuitry. The development of the socio-
emotional system and cognitive control system are driven by brain maturation.  Steinberg 
proposes that changes in the socio-emotional system are largely due to changes in the 
brain’s dopamine system.  Dopamine is the neurochemical basis of reward (Ernst & 
Spear, 2009), which has been implicated in reward-related learning (Chambers, Taylor, & 
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Potenza, 2003).  Dopamine plays a critical role in the brain’s reward circuitry, so the 
increase, reduction, and redistribution of dopamine receptors that happens in early 
adolescence may have important implications for sensation seeking (Steinberg, 2008). 
Dopaminergic activity plays a critical role in affective and motivational processing, 
which is integral for social and emotional processing (Spear, 2000; Steinberg, 2010b; 
Steinberg, 2008). The brain structures associated with the dopamine processes include the 
amygdala, nucleus accumbens, orbitofrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, and 
superior temporal sulcus (Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005).  Some brain 
regions involved in reward sensitivity overlap with regions involved in social and 
emotional processing, such as the ventral striatum and the medial prefrontal cortex (see 
Steinberg, 2008).  Also, the density of dopamine transporters which remove dopamine 
from the synapse peaks during adolescence in the striatum, which implies increased 
movement of dopamine from neuron to neuron.  In one study, adolescents showed higher 
activation than adults in the orbito-frontal cortex and ventral striatum in anticipation of 
reward (Geier et al., 2010) suggesting heightened dopamine activity among adolescents. 
In animal models, dopamine receptor density appears to increase around puberty and 
decrease in late adolescence in the striatum and prefrontal cortex (Sisk & Foster, 2004). 
The general remodeling of the system likely leads to an increase in dopamine activity in 
the straitum during early adolescence, which would perhaps interfere with self-control. 
Behaviorally, an increase in dopamine activity suggests that pleasure obtained from 
rewarding stimuli is increased (Steinberg, 2010b), and individuals may be especially 
likely to seek out rewarding activities.     
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The brain changes responsible for the development of the cognitive control 
system include general synaptic pruning, perhaps most significantly in the prefrontal 
cortex (Keating, 2004), and the continued myelination of prefrontal brain regions.  Both 
of these changes result in improved connectivity among cortical areas, including the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior and posterior cingulate, and temporo-parietal 
cortices.  The increased connectivity within these areas allows for development of many 
aspects of executive function, such as response inhibition, planning ahead, weighing risks 
and rewards, and the simultaneous consideration of multiple sources of information 
(Steinberg et al., 2008; Steinberg, 2008).   In other words, the cortical brain regions 
responsible for cognitive control are able to be activated and could possibly override the 
responses of the subcortical regions, which are sensitive to rewarding social and 
emotional stimuli.  The changes in the cognitive control system occur gradually and are 
not completed until the mid-20s (Steinberg, 2008).   In summary, according to this model, 
most risk behavior declines in adulthood because the maturity of the cognitive control 
system eventually matches the maturity of the socio-emotional system.  Ideally, the 
cognitive control system is capable of monitoring and/or overriding responses of the 
socio-emotional system when necessary (i.e., when one is about to do something 
dangerous).  
Empirical evidence of the neurobiological model. Empirical evidence supports 
the existence of the two systems.  One recent analysis of age differences in performance 
on the Iowa Gambling Task (a typical laboratory decision making task that involves risks 
and rewards) found that reward sensitivity increases between ages 10 and 16 and then 
declines thereafter (congruent to conceptions of the development of a socio-emotional 
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system).  Thus, reward sensitivity in included in the present conceptualization of the 
socio-emotional system. Attentiveness to punishment, however, increases gradually and 
linearly with age (congruent with the timing of development of the cognitive control 
system; Cauffman et al., 2010) and is included in the conceptualization of cognitive 
control.  These findings lend support to the argument that heightened risk taking in 
adolescence, relative to childhood or adulthood, may be due in part to an increase in 
reward salience during adolescence.  Another study showed that younger adolescents 
were more likely than young adults to engage in delay discounting, which means that 
they were more likely to prefer a smaller reward that they would receive sooner as 
opposed to a larger reward that they would have to wait for (Steinberg, Graham, O’Brien, 
Woolard, Cauffman, & Banich, 2009).  Regarding the cognitive control system, future 
orientation variables such as planning ahead and anticipation of consequences of 
decisions was relatively low among younger adolescents, but continued to develop into 
early adulthood (Steinberg et al., 2009).  Therefore, future orientation is included in the 
cognitive control system.  Similarly, performance on the Tower of London (a behavioral 
task designed to assess goal-directed planning which involves arranging items in a 
specified way in the fewest number of moves) improved through the early twenties and 
was fully mediated by impulse control (Albert & Steinberg, 2011).  This suggests that 
planning and controlling one’s impulses are directly related to each other.  In yet another 
study, sensation seeking was found to peak in early adolescence and then decrease, 
following a curvilinear pattern, which is the same timeline as development of the socio-
emotional system and included in the present conceptualization of the socio-emotional 
system, whereas impulsivity was found to decrease linearly into young adulthood 
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(Steinberg et al., 2008), potentially suggesting a linear increase in self-regulation, which 
is the same timeline as development of the cognitive control system and included in the 
conceptualization for the cognitive control system.   
Studies on peer influence, a likely source of rewarding stimuli, provide further 
evidence of the mismatch between the two systems during adolescence. A study of the 
effect of peer influence on adolescents’ risky decisions in the context of a simulated 
driving task demonstrated linear development of resistance to peer influence.  Some 
participants had a peer present and some did not. Results showed that peer presence 
strongly affected adolescents’ “risky” driving decisions before age 18, then the peer 
effect decreased, and by age 24 peers had a negligible effect (Gardner & Steinberg, 
2005).  Similarly, a paper and pencil measure of resistance to peer influence (part of the 
cognitive control system) showed that individuals increased in their resistance between 
ages 14 and 18, but there was no age-related change for younger or older adolescents 
(Steinberg & Monahan, 2007; Sumter, Bokhorst, Steinberg, & Westenberg, 2009). In a 
different social exposure experiment, young adult participants aged 19-30 who observed 
peers participate in a gambling task and saw the outcomes of the peers’ choices were 
more likely to make a risky selection on the same task (Yechiam, Druyan, & Ert, 2008).  
These studies suggest that socio-emotional system constructs, including reward 
sensitivity, susceptibility to peer influence and delay discounting, develop early in 
adolescence and are a strong factor in making decisions throughout adolescence. 
Furthermore, the cognitive control system involves constructs that could be loosely 
categorized as cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and social regulatory capacities and 
continues to develop into early adulthood.   
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The neurobiological model is the basis for the present study for a number of 
reasons.  First, this model describes the unique aspects of adolescence that help to explain 
the emergence of risk-taking behaviors.  Second, it explains why risk-taking eventually 
declines in adulthood. Finally, it provides a more coherent and exhaustive explanation of 
adolescent development because it includes or at least acknowledges many aspects of 
development, including biological, social, temperamental, emotional, and cognitive 
changes, all of which may help to explain why adolescents are at an increased risk for 
endangering themselves by making unhealthy and potentially dangerous decisions.  The 
research questions were designed to strengthen the empirical evidence related to the 
neurobiological model, merge it with more traditional conceptions of the dual-process 
model, and address current shortcomings of the model.  
It has been suggested that the neurobiological model may be a new “grand 
theory” of adolescent development in the vein of Erikson or Piaget (Steinberg & Lerner, 
2004; Steinberg, 2010a).  While this remains to be seen, it does incite many new 
questions and research possibilities, a few of which are addressed in this study.  First, as 
previously mentioned, this neurobiological dual-systems model has some similarities 
with other, more traditional dual-process decision making models, but the potential 
associations between deliberative/intuitive processing and the cognitive control/socio-
emotional systems have not been tested.  The current study examined some of these 
connections.  Second, risk behaviors have been typically operationalized as gambling 
behaviors in a laboratory setting (Cauffman et al., 2010; Steinberg et al., 2009) or as 
antisocial activities of antisocial youth (Monahan, Steinberg, Cauffman, & Mulvey, 
2009).  It is presumed that these types of risk will translate to other types of risk behavior, 
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such as substance use, risky sexual behavior, and more moderate forms of delinquent 
behavior, but no studies have tested this. The current study tested associations between 
deliberative and intuitive decision making and “real-world” risk behaviors, which to my 
knowledge has only been tested in adults or with a behavioral decision making task.  
Finally, the neurobiological model is mainly a developmental model and has not yet 
accounted for many individual and social differences that may moderate the relation 
between the socio-emotional system and risk behavior and help account for adolescents 
who avoid risk behavior.  The next section introduces some potential individual and 
social differences that are likely to influence the processes associated with the 
neurobiological model and risk behavior.  
Individual and Social influences on Adolescent Decision Making and Risk Behavior 
Epstein and Pacini (1999) reported that everyone employs both the deliberative 
and intuitive styles of decision making, but there are important individual differences in 
the quantity and quality of their use.  For instance, temperamental aspects, such as self-
regulation, are thought to be important for adolescents to make good decisions (Byrnes, 
2002; Steinberg, 2007). Although the neurobiological model characterizes self-regulation 
as a developmental variable generally defined as controlling impulses, there are also 
individual differences in levels of self-regulation among adolescents of the same age 
(Raffaelli & Crockett, 2003).   
Surprisingly little research has been devoted to individual risk taking in a social 
context (Yechiam et al., 2008).  Peers are clearly an important social influence which 
engages the socio-emotional system by increasing the rewarding aspects of various 
behaviors, likely affecting decisions.  Although some young people are more susceptible 
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to peer influence than others (Allen, Chango, Szwedo, Schad, & Marston, 2012), it is 
reasonable that if friends tend to engage in risk behavior or are even present, adolescents 
may be at increased risk of engaging the socio-emotional process, highlighting the 
rewards of risk taking more so than for individuals with friends who typically do not 
engage in risk behavior. Therefore, deviant peers may exacerbate the relationship 
between socio-emotional processes and risk behavior. Possibly, the positive effect of 
deviant peers could also interfere with the cognitive control system, lessening the effect 
of cognitive control on risk behavior.  
Although it should be noted that there are other individual and social variables 
that would potentially affect decision making and risk behavior, for the purposes of the 
present study, one variable representing each of the two types of individual differences 
(temperamental and social) were examined.  These variables were chosen because they 
may play an especially important role in adolescent risk behavior and could moderate the 
processes of the neurobiological model. The current research extends the 
conceptualization of the neurobiological model by introducing key social and individual 
differences, adding breadth to our understanding of this model.   
Temperament: Self-regulation.  There are several conceptualizations of self-
regulation.  For this manuscript, self-regulation is defined as the ability to control, 
monitor, inhibit, persevere, guide and change one’s behavior, attention, emotion, and 
cognitions in line with one’s goals and/or social awareness (Brown, 1998; Kopp, 1982; 
Moilanen, 2007; Neal & Carey, 2005; Raffaelli & Crockett, 2003; Thompson, 1994).  
According to Byrnes (2002), the need for self-regulated decision making is especially 
important for adolescents because they are becoming more autonomous and making 
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decisions on their own without the aid of adults.  It is important for adolescents and 
young adults to be able to make important decisions carefully and thoughtfully and to be 
somewhat regulated in order to accomplish difficult or complex goals, such as getting a 
job.   
According to the neurobiological model, self-regulation is a key component of the 
cognitive control system, and continued maturation of this system is thought to be the 
reason that risk behavior decreases in adulthood.  However, self-regulation begins to 
develop well before adolescence, as early as late infancy (Kopp, 1982), and increases 
between early and middle childhood (Raffaelli, Crockett, & Shen, 2005).  Lower self-
regulation has been related to substance use and sexual risk taking in cross-sectional and 
longitudinal studies of adolescents (Wulfert, Block, Santa Ana, Rodriguez, & Colsman, 
2002; Raffaelli &Crockett, 2003; Crockett, Raffaelli, & Shen, 2006). Also, poor 
cognitive self-regulation, or executive function, was linked to an over-emphasis on the 
benefits associated with risky activities and a higher incidence of problems associated 
with excessive alcohol consumption. Furthermore, poor emotion regulation predicted 
greater participation in risk behaviors such as cigarette smoking and alcohol-induced 
behaviors such as fighting and arguing (Magar, Phillips, & Hosie, 2008).  A study of 
young adults showed that participants who were successful in regulating their emotions 
using an imagery-focused relaxation strategy showed a subsequent decrease in risky 
decision making in a gambling task (Martin & Delgado, 2011).  This change in behavior 
was accompanied by decreased activation in the striatum, providing further evidence of 
brain areas in the cognitive control system being related to self-regulation. The linkages 
between self-regulation and risk behaviors indicate that individual differences in levels of 
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self-regulation should be included in conceptualizations of the neurobiological model, 
protecting individuals from risk behaviors.  
Social influences: Deviant friends.  Adolescence is a life stage in which there 
are changes in the type and importance of social influences on behavior.  While family 
influences remain strong, peers increase in their influence (Brown, 2004).  It is an 
important developmental task to form strong bonds with peers to avoid negative 
outcomes such as depression (see Allen et al., 2012).  There are several ways that peers 
can affect adolescent decision making.  For example, peers can affect decision making 
directly by giving advice on decisions or indirectly by promoting various goals or 
modeling different decision making styles.  Adolescents tend to seek their friends’ advice 
for shorter term, less important, less difficult and/or more social decisions (Wilks, 1986; 
Bednar & Fisher, 2003).  As peers are at the same life stage, they also provide the 
opportunity to discuss choices about the goals for the future with others going through 
similar experiences at the same time (Nurmi, 1991).   
Peers are usually conceived as a negative influence on adolescent decision 
making.  Gardner and Steinberg’s (2005) study with the simulated driving task 
experimentally measured immediate risk decisions of adolescents by having them play a 
video game in which the purpose was to drive somewhere as quickly as possible without 
crashing, which means deciding whether to run through yellow lights.  Some participants 
completed the task in the presence of a same-age peer that they knew.  The adolescent 
participants were more likely to take risks when in the presence of the peer whereas 
young adults (age 24 and older) were not, suggesting that adolescents are more 
susceptible than adults to peer influence (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005).  This study implies 
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that the mere presence of a peer impacts adolescents’ (but not adults’) decision making.  
This is consistent with the neurobiological model because peer approval and presence are 
thought to be rewarding and therefore likely to increase the rewarding sensation of risky 
behaviors in early to mid adolescence when the socio-emotional system is at its peak.  
Furthermore, resistance to peer influence appears to increase with age, consistent with the 
development of the cognitive control system.   
Peers also have an effect on decision making because they affect what their 
friends consider to be normative for their age group.  Beliefs about what peers are doing 
can be an influential factor on decisions and the resulting behavior even if those beliefs 
are incorrect.  For instance, people of all ages partake in the false consensus effect, 
meaning that they assume others’ attitudes and behaviors will resemble their own 
(Loewenstein & Furstenberg, 1991).  This allows persistence in attitudes and behavior 
because people believe that their peers generally agree with them.  Pluralistic ignorance 
refers to the tendency for people to overestimate the population base rates for activities in 
which they themselves are engaged (Jacobs & Johnston, 2005).  This is generally more 
common with adolescents because it is harder for them to make accurate base-rate 
estimates of behavior and attitudes due to their limited experience and feedback from 
earlier decisions (Jacobs & Johnston, 2005).  For example, in one study, 7th and 8th grade 
students responded to questions about their risk behaviors as well as some neutral 
behaviors like riding a bike or feeling sick (Jacobs & Johnston, 2005).  In general, the 
adolescents overestimated the occurrences of all behaviors among peers.   However, 
adolescents who highly overestimated the occurrences of deviant behaviors were more 
likely to have engaged in deviant behaviors themselves (Jacobs & Johnston, 2005).  This 
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likely occurs because adolescents must draw on their own experiences and interactions 
with peers to estimate base-rates of behaviors.  Similarly, adolescents who had 
experienced sexual intercourse believed that significantly more peers also had intercourse 
as compared those who had not experienced sexual intercourse (Loewenstein & 
Furstenberg, 1991).  The accuracy of base-rate estimates may be related to a variety of 
individual factors, such as prior experience, motivation, or metacognitive skills 
(Klaczynski, 2005).  Although these studies emphasize what an individual believes his or 
her friends are doing, it is likely that the actual behaviors of friends will also influence 
individuals’ perceptions of what is normative and individuals will be more likely to 
engage in the behaviors themselves if they think they are normative.  
Having deviant friends is a consistently strong predictor of delinquent activity 
(Hawkins, Catalano, & Miller, 1992; Dishion, Andrews, & Crosby, 1995; Brendgen, 
Vitaro, & Bukowski, 2000a; Brendgen, Vitaro, & Bukowski, 2000b; Haynie & Osgood, 
2005). There are a number of reasons that deviant friends may affect adolescent risk 
behavior.  For instance, deviant friends reinforce preexisting delinquent or sensation-
seeking tendencies (Patterson, Dishion, & Yoerger, 2000).  Reinforcement may occur due 
to deviancy training, which occurs when there is positive discussion of antisocial 
behavior among peers.  Deviancy training predicted delinquent behavior two years later, 
controlling for prior levels of delinquency (Dishion, Spracklen, Andrews, & Patterson, 
1996).   This suggests that deviant friends are directly influencing the target individuals’ 
risk behavior and it is not necessarily a matter of choosing friends who are deviant. One 
recent study found that peer substance use at baseline predicted change in adolescents’ 
substance use, although this effect was exacerbated by other social and contextual 
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variables (Allen et al., 2012). Consistent with the neurobiological model’s assertion that 
resistance to peer influence is linked to the cognitive control system, which increases into 
adulthood, it was found that the relations between having deviant friends and antisocial 
behavior decreased with age in a group of antisocial adolescents (Monahan et al., 2009).  
According to the neurobiological model, the presence of peers increases the reward 
sensation of risk behaviors.  So, if friends are engaging in risk behaviors and pleasing 
one’s friends is related to reward, then it follows that one would also engage in the risk 
behavior. Therefore, deviant peers would likely have an increased impact on adolescents’ 
risk behaviors.  
In conclusion, individual differences in self-regulation and deviant friends need to 
be considered in conceptualizations of the neurobiological model, which to date has 
largely focused on developmental changes. These individual/social variables are likely to 
matter for decision making and risk behavior in conjunction with age.  
The Present Study 
The current study is based on the neurobiological model and designed to address 
gaps in this model.  First, as mentioned earlier, this dual-systems model refers to two 
brain systems, not necessarily two decision making processes like the other dual-process 
models described in this paper.  It is possible (and seems likely) that the indicators of the 
socio-emotional system including increased sensation seeking, reward sensitivity, and 
emotional reactivity are related to intuitive decision making because they appear to  be 
indicative of quick processing that occurs subconsciously. Similarly, it is possible that the 
cognitive control processes including resistance to peer influence, future orientation, and 
punishment sensitivity are related to deliberative decision making because they are 
34 
 
 
 
indicative of thoughtful processing that occurs with conscious effort.   These potential 
relations are investigated in the present study. Second, the variables related to the socio-
emotional system are said to be related to risk behavior; however, this has generally been 
tested with gambling tasks.  It is, as of yet, unclear if intuitive decision making is related 
to “real world” risk behaviors such as substance use, delinquent activity, or risky sexual 
activity.  It is also currently unclear whether deliberative processing is related to 
abstaining from “real-world” risk behaviors.   The current research addresses these gaps 
by directly examining the relation between deliberative and intuitive decision making and 
risk behavior. Finally, it is unknown how individual and contextual differences in self-
regulation and deviant friends, moderate the relations between the socio-emotional and 
cognitive control systems and risk behavior. This study examines the potential 
moderating effects of these variables.   
Research Question 1.  The neurobiological model is a dual-systems model in that 
it specifies two brain systems that develop on different timetables, leading to an increase 
and subsequent decrease in risk behavior.  However, it has not been clearly linked to 
more “traditional” dual-process decision making models, although there are potential 
overlaps.  For instance, sensation seeking of the socio-emotional system implies quick, 
emotion based processing, similar to intuitive decision making. Self-regulation and 
similar variables associated with the cognitive control system imply deliberative style 
processing, in which one thinks through decisions and controls impulses.   
Hypothesis 1. Socio-emotional processes (sensation seeking, reward sensitivity, 
and emotional reactivity) are correlated with intuitive decision making (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. It was hypothesized that there would be a positive relation between the socio-
emotional system and intuitive decision making 
Hypothesis 2. Cognitive control processes (self-regulation, resistance to peer 
influence, future orientation, and punishment sensitivity) are correlated with deliberative 
decision making (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. It was hypothesized that there would be a positive relation between the 
cognitive control system and deliberative decision making 
Hypothesis 3. In line with previous research (see Klaczynski, 2005), it is expected 
that deliberative and intuitive decision making are each positively correlated with age 
because cognitive abilities and heuristics increase with age.  
Research Question 2. The neurobiological model says that the development of 
the socio-emotional system (in the absence of cognitive control) is to blame for increased 
risk behavior in adolescence, and development of the cognitive control system is related 
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to decreased risk behavior. Assuming that the variables of the socio-emotional system are 
related to intuitive processing and the variables of the cognitive control system are related 
to deliberative processing, is deliberative decision making or intuitive decision making 
more likely to predict risk behaviors? 
Hypothesis 4a.  Deliberative decision making is negatively associated with risk 
behavior because careful reflection on possible courses of action is suspected to be 
similar to cognitive control processes and which are expected to lead to healthier 
decisions.   
Hypothesis 4b. Intuitive decision making is positively associated with risk 
behavior (see Figure 3).   Although fuzzy trace theory suggests otherwise, a positive 
correlation between intuitive decision making and risk behavior was expected because 
intuitive decision making implies a lack of planning and adolescents often report that 
most risk behavior is unplanned (Gerrard et al., 2008); therefore, risk behavior should be 
related to intuitive processing. 
 
Figure 3. Hypothesized relationship between decision making processes and risk 
behavior.  
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Research Question 3. The neurobiological model does not take individual 
differences in factors influencing adolescent decision making and risk behavior into 
account.  Not all adolescents of the same age participate in the same amount of risk 
behavior, suggesting that individual differences play an important role in risk behavior.  
In particular, there may be temperamental and social differences involved in the increase 
and subsequent decrease of risk behavior.  With the intention of being realistic, the 
present research examined one variable from each domain of interest (temperamental and 
social) as shown in Figures 4a-4c.  
Hypothesis 5: Temperament (self-regulation).  Self-regulation develops 
throughout childhood and adolescence, and differences in self-regulation predict risk 
behaviors. It was hypothesized that self-regulation would moderate the relationship 
between socio-emotional processes and risk behavior because those who are more 
regulated would not be as susceptible to rewarding stimuli (Figure 4a).  Specifically, it 
was expected that the structural path between the socio-emotional latent variable and risk 
behavior will be significantly weaker for those with higher self-regulation.    
 
Figure 4a. Hypothesized interaction between socio-emotional process and self-regulation 
predicting risk behavior.  
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Hypothesis 6: Social influences (peers).  It was expected that affiliating with 
deviant friends would moderate the relationship between socio-emotional processes and 
risk behavior, such that the relationship would be significantly stronger for those with 
deviant friends than those without deviant friends.  Deviant friends are a strong and 
consistent predictor of risk behavior.  Most risk-taking occurs in groups, presumably 
because friends are a source of rewarding stimuli.  Therefore having deviant friends not 
only predicts risk behavior but would also exacerbate the relationship between socio-
emotional processing and risk behavior (Figure 4b).  Furthermore, deviant peers will 
moderate the relationship between cognitive control processes and risk behavior such that 
the relationship will be weaker for those with deviant peers (Figure 4c).  Deviant friends 
may interfere with the regulatory capacities of the cognitive control system by exerting 
an influence over risk behavior that buffers the cognitive control system. 
 
Figure 4b. Hypothesized interaction between socio-emotional process and deviant peers 
predicting risk behavior. 
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Figure 4c. Hypothesized interaction between cognitive control process and deviant peers 
predicting risk behavior.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
Sample 
Data were collected from a large public University in the Midwest. A total of 397 
undergraduate students completed a questionnaire for course credit. Fifteen participants 
were not included in the final analyses because they were at least 25 years old and 
therefore beyond the targeted age range.  There were 382 participants in the final sample 
(62.6% women).  The average age was 19.25 (SD = 1.33) years old and the racial/ethnic 
makeup was 84% White, 2.6% Black/African American, 5.0% Latino/a, 6.0% Asian, and 
1.8% biracial.  Approximately half of the participants had at least one parent with a 
college degree and just over 70% came from households with an annual income of at 
least $60,000.  For current living situation, 52% lived in a dorm, 3.7% lived in an on-
campus apartment, 12.8% lived in a Greek House, 20.7% lived off-campus with 
roommates, 3.1% lived off-campus alone, 6.5% lived with parents or guardians, and 0.8% 
lived with a significant other and/or children.  The rates of risk behavior participation 
were similar to other samples in terms of alcohol use, but this current sample may have 
had more individuals who were smokers and used marijuana (see Johnston et al., 2011). 
Measures 
 All measures were based on self-report. 
Demographics. Age, ethnicity, and gender (0 = men, 1 = women) were included 
in the questionnaires.  Due to relatively low frequencies of many of the racial and ethnic 
categories, race was re-coded combining the three lowest frequency categories.  The 
resulting race variable (White, Asian, and combined Black, Latino, and Biracial) was 
dummy-coded with Whites as the reference group. Parent’s degree of education, income, 
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and occupation were included to serve as proxies for socio-economic status. Education 
was originally on a scale from 1 (less than 7th grade) to 9 (doctoral degree). Few 
participants had parents with less than a high school degree, so responses were re-coded 
with 1 referring to any education less than high school.  For those who gave education 
levels for two parents or guardians, education level was averaged across parents. If 
respondents indicated one parent’s education level, then the score for that parent was 
retained.  Annual family income was ranked on scale with responses from 1(0 - $15,000) 
to 8 (over $105,000). Occupational status was assessed following the recommendation of 
(Davis, Smith, Hakao, & Treas, 1991).  Participants were shown a list of example jobs 
and told to choose which was most similar to what their parents or guardians did for 
living. For example, the occupations of day laborer, food preparation worker, or janitor 
were labeled as 1; occupations of physician, aerospace engineer, or CEO were labeled as 
8.   Relatively more prestigious occupations were ranked higher. For those who 
responded that two parents or guardians had jobs, occupation was averaged across 
parents.  If respondents indicated that only one parent had a job, then the score for that 
parent was retained.  Participants’ living situation was also included because individuals 
may have increased opportunities for risk behavior if they live on their own or with 
roommates compared to living with parents or in college dorms.  Response options were 
on-campus dorm, on-campus apartment, Greek house, off-campus with roommates, off-
campus by yourself, with legal guardians, and other.  All participants who chose “other” 
lived with a significant other and/or children, so a new category was created.  Due to low 
frequencies of some categories, residence was re-coded for inclusion as controls in the 
main analyses.  The new categories were on-campus, Greek House, off-campus with 
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roommates or alone, and off-campus with parents or other family.  These categories were 
dummy coded with on-campus as the reference group.  
Psychometric Evaluation. Latent variables reflecting study measures were 
identified by fitting a single latent factor with items as indicators. Assessment of good 
model fit was provided by the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), with values greater than .95, 
the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), with values less than .06, and 
the Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMR) with values less than .08 (Hu & 
Bentler,1999). Mplus 5.1 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010) was used for all CFAs and 
primary study analyses. Modification indices were examined for potential correlated 
errors that improved model fit.  Parameter estimates were examined before and after 
adding correlated errors to ensure that they did not change the model drastically. 
Maximum likelihood with robust standard errors (MLR) was used.  After CFAs were 
conducted on each measure, latent variables of socio-emotional processing (indicated by 
reward sensitivity, emotional reactivity, and sensation seeking) and cognitive control 
(indicated by self-regulation, resistance to peer influence, future orientation, and 
punishment sensitivity) were estimated. 
Adolescent risk behavior. Risk behavior was examined as an overall latent 
variable and types of risk behavior were examined separately.  This was because, 
although there are similarities in the predictors of risk behavior, (Savin-Williams & 
Diamond, 2004; Chassin et al., 2004), there may also be important differences between 
types of risk behavior. For instance, risk behaviors may have different short-term and 
long-term consequences and some may be relatively more “normative,” which may affect 
the decision making process.  For example, substance use can lead to physical illness in 
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the short term and possible addiction in the long term.  Drinking alcohol also tends to be 
more normative, especially in a college sample, whereas more serious risk behavior may 
be more strongly predicted by factors that are less common (e.g., deviant friends).  Sexual 
risk-taking is unique in terms of risk behaviors because healthy sexual development is 
important for future sexual/romantic relationships, but there are, of course, potential 
negative consequences of risky sexual activity including unintended pregnancy, sexually 
transmitted diseases, decline in school attendance and educational aspirations, and 
relations with other types of risk behavior (Savin-Williams & Diamond, 2004). 
Therefore, a variety of adolescent risk behaviors were assessed including various 
types of substance use, risky sexual behavior, and delinquency (Johnston, O’Malley, 
Bachman, & Schulenberg, 2009; CDC, 2010; Crockett et al., 2006).  For substance use, 
questions were asked regarding tobacco use (e.g., “How often have you smoked 
cigarettes?” and “How often have you used smokeless tobacco?”) with response options 
ranging from 0 (never) to 9 (every day or almost every day).  The same basic questions 
with the same response options were used for alcohol use and other recreational drug use.  
For alcohol use, questions were asked about the frequency of drinking alcohol, getting 
drunk, binge drinking, and driving while intoxicated.  Drunk driving was positively 
skewed and had high kurtosis so it was square root transformed. The other three items, 
which were on the same response scale were averaged so that a single alcohol use 
variable could be used as an indicator of a latent general risk variable.  Just under 13% of 
the sample indicated using drugs other than marijuana, so a single dichotomous variable 
was created indicating whether participants had ever used any illegal drugs other than 
marijuana. The marijuana use item was square root transformed because it was positively 
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skewed.  Drug use and marijuana use were each used only as single item indicators in 
addition to being included in a latent variable of overall risk behavior.   
Risky sexual behavior included questions about whether participants ever had sex, 
number of total lifetime sexual partners (with response options ranging from 1[1] to 
5[more than 4]), condom use and other birth control use (e.g., “How often do you (or 
does your partner) use a condom when you have sex?”) with response options ranging 
from 1 (always) to 5 (never) so that higher scores indicated riskier behavior.  Condom use 
was negatively correlated with other types of birth control; perhaps because most 
individuals believe that one type of birth control is effective enough and if they already 
use one form of contraception, they are less likely to use another. Therefore, only number 
of partners and condom use were used as single item indicators of risky sexual behavior 
and included in the general latent risk behavior variable.  
For delinquent behaviors, questions were asked about stealing, fighting, 
vandalism, and arrest, e.g., “How often did you deliberately damage property that didn’t 
belong to you?” with response options ranging from 0 (never or not in past year) to 7 
(about once a week).  An item about threatening someone with a weapon was dropped 
because too few participants engaged in this behavior.  An item about being arrested was 
also dropped because no participant had ever been arrested more than once and very few 
had been arrested even once, reducing variability.  The final scale had nine items (α = 
.67) and a CFA revealed good model fit, χ 2(25) =28.42, p < .001, CFI = .99, RMSEA = 
.02, SRMR = .05, once two correlated errors were added. An average delinquency score 
was also created to use in the general risk behavior latent variable and square rooted 
because it was positively skewed and had kurtosis. 
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For the general risk latent variable, because drug use was modeled as a 
dichotomous variable, fit statistics were not available.  Without drug use in the model, 
model fit was good (χ2(14) = 40.38, p < .001, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .04) so 
it was assumed the latent variable was appropriate when drug use was in the model.  For 
the Research Questions about risk behavior the following dependent variables were used: 
(1) latent general risk behavior indicated by alcohol use, number of sexual partners, 
condom use, drug use, marijuana use, tobacco use, and drunk driving; (2)  latent alcohol 
use indicated by frequency of drinking, frequency of binge drinking, frequency of 
intoxication, and square-rooted drunk driving, which fit as a single latent factor (χ2(2) = 
2.94, p < .37, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .01); (3) latent substance use indicated 
by drug, marijuana, tobacco, alcohol use (the average of frequency of drinking, binge 
drinking, and drinking to intoxication), and  square-rooted drunk driving (fit statistics 
without drug use: χ2(14) = 32.44, p < .001, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .04); (4) 
observed number of sexual partners (single item); (5) observed condom use (single item); 
(6) observed smoking (single item); (7) observed marijuana use (single item); (8) 
observed drug use (single item – dichotomous); (9) latent delinquency, whose model fit is 
described above in the Measures section.  For a path diagram of the general risk behavior 
variable, see Figures 7 and 8. For the sexual risk taking items, only participants who 
responded that they had engaged in sexual intercourse (72.8%) were included in the 
analyses.   
Deliberative and intuitive decision making.  Two measures were used to assess 
the two decision making processes: the Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Scale 
(PID) (Betsch, 2004 as cited in Richetin, Perugini, Adjali, & Hurling, 2007) and the 
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Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), which have 18 items and 
38 items, respectively.  The response options ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). The PID showed good test-retest reliability in previous studies (Richetin 
et al., 2007). The REI had good internal consistency and concurrent validity in a previous 
study (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). In the current study, internal consistency was low for the 
PID (α = .51) and CFAs on the scales separately and combined revealed bad model fit. In 
order to examine decision making more directly (as opposed to related constructs, such as 
a preference/dislike for abstract thinking), only items that were specifically regarding 
making decisions were analyzed in a CFA, which revealed good model fit: for 
deliberative decision making, χ 2(27) =45.28, p = .02, CFI = .97, RMSEA =  .04, SRMR 
= .04) and for intuitive decision making, χ 2(31) =61.13, p < .001, CFI = .95, RMSEA =  
.05, SRMR = .04). Two correlated errors were added to the deliberative decision making 
and four were added to the intuitive decision making model. These new scales were used 
as latent variables in the primary analyses.  See Appendix A for all items. An example 
item in the final deliberation scale (9 items, α = .79) is “Before making decisions, I first 
think them through.” An example item in the final intuition scale (10 items, α = .76) is 
“With most decisions it makes sense to completely rely on your feelings.”  
Sensation seeking.  A subset of items from Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking Scale 
(SSS; Zuckerman, 1979) was used to assess novelty and reward seeking, following 
Steinberg et al. (2008).  This scale originally had binary response options (yes/no); 
however, using multiple ordered-response categories can be more informative and 
reliable (Embretson & Reise, 2000), so the scale was adjusted so that response options 
were on a Likert scale ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). An 
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example item is, “I like doing things just for the thrill of it.” In the SSS, the six items 
used were chosen to avoid using items that may reflect impulsivity, as sensation seeking 
and impulsivity are distinct constructs (Steinberg et al., 2008).  The scale was found to 
have good model fit with two correlated errors (χ 2(7) = 23.34, p < .001, CFI = .98, 
RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .03), although the RMSEA was slightly high, and good internal 
consistency (α = .83).   
Reward sensitivity.  The reward sensitivity subscale (10 items) of the Sensitivity 
to Reward and Sensitivity to Punishment Questionnaire (short form) (SRSPQ-S; 
Torrubia, Ávila, Moltó, & Caseras, 2001) was used to assess attraction to rewarding 
stimuli.  The short form improved on some psychometric issues and correlated highly 
with the original scale (r = over .90 for each subscale) (Cooper & Gomez, 2008).  A 
sample item of the reward sensitivity subscale is, “Do you like being the center of 
attention at a party or social meeting?” with response options ranging from 1(never) to 
5(always). Items that were negatively inter-correlated were dropped from the scale.  The 
final reward sensitivity (α = .68) scale with one correlated error showed good model fit, 
except that the CFI was a little low (χ 2(7) = 72.73, p < .001, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .06, 
SRMR = .05).  
Emotional reactivity.  Two scales were used to assess emotional reactivity: The 
Affect Intensity measure (AIM; Larsen & Diener, 1987) and the Mood Survey 
(Underwood & Froming, 1980).  Items were chosen that, based on face validity, pertain 
specifically to emotional lability and emotional intensity because these constructs are 
likely to pertain to the socio-emotional system.  The AIM was originally composed of 40 
items, e.g., “When I am excited over something I want to share my feelings with 
48 
 
 
 
everyone,” with response options ranging from 1 (never) to 6(always).  The Mood Survey 
originally included 16 items, e.g., “I may change from happy to sad and back again 
several times in a week,” with response options ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 
(strongly disagree).  Items were coded so that higher scores were indicative of more 
emotional reactivity.  Items that were negatively inter-correlated or did not load onto a 
single factor were dropped.  A CFA of the final single factor (α = .72) indicated good fit 
once four correlated errors were added, χ 2(23) = 70.16, p < .001, CFI = .94, RMSEA = 
.07, SRMR = .05.  The latent variable was used in the primary analyses. 
Resistance to peer influence.  Participants read 10 pairs of statements and chose 
which statement best described them. Then respondents indicated whether the statement 
was “really true” or “sort of” true of them.  The responses were coded on a 4-point scale 
ranging from “really true” of one descriptor to “really true” of the other descriptor.  
Higher scores indicated a higher resistance to peer influence. A sample item is, “Some 
people go along with their friends just to keep their friends happy BUT other people 
refuse to go along with what their friends want to do, even though they know that it will 
make their friends unhappy,” (Steinberg & Monahan, 2007).  A CFA revealed good fit 
with two correlated errors added (χ 2(34) = 64.02, p < .001, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .05, 
SRMR = .04 and had adequate internal consistency (α = .75). The latent variable was 
used in the primary analyses. 
Self-regulation.  Participants completed the Self-Regulation Questionnaire-Short 
form (SSRQ) (Carey, Neal, & Collins, 2004). It included 19 items (α = .85), e.g., “I am 
able to accomplish goals I set for myself,” with response options ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  Items were dropped if were specifically about decision 
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making so that the measures would not be confounded.  CFA results with four correlated 
errors revealed acceptable model fit, χ 2(100) = 200.17, p < .001, CFI = .92, RMSEA = 
.05, SRMR = .05. The latent variable was used in the primary analyses. 
Future orientation.  This measure included 11 items (α = .85) that assess time 
perspective, future consideration, planning and goals, e.g., “I can see my life 10 years 
from now,” with response options ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (always).  Some items 
were taken from a measure was created by the NICHD Early Child Care Research 
Network from various scales measuring similar constructs. Other items assessing came 
from a scale of educational and occupational expectations (Seginer, 2009). A CFA 
showed good fit with correlated errors added, χ 2(31) = 73.03, p < .001, CFI = .95, 
RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .04. 
Punishment sensitivity.  The punishment sensitivity subscale (14 items) of the 
SRSPQ-S (described above; Cooper & Gomez, 2008) was used.  Again, the response 
options from the original scale are dichotomous (yes/no), however, ordered category- 
response options were used instead ranging from 1(never) to 5(always). This scale had 
good model fit after correlated errors were added (χ 2(86) = 198.85, p < .001, CFI = .93, 
RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .05) and good reliability (α = .86) A sample item is, “Are you 
often afraid of new or unexpected situations?”   
Deviant friends.  Participants completed the Deviant Peer Group Affiliation 
questionnaire (18 items) (Dishion, Patterson, Stoolmiller, & Skinner, 1991). The original 
scale included both negative (e.g., How many of your friends got drunk?) and positive 
(e.g., How many of your friends do or have done volunteer work?) peer activities with 
response options ranging from 1 (none) to 5 (almost all).  Only the items reflecting 
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negative behaviors were used to address the research hypothesis about the influence of 
deviant peers.  This measure had good internal consistency (α = .86).  Three items were 
dropped due to low variability. CFA results of the final measure showed acceptable 
model fit, χ 2(31) = 113.15, p < .001, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .05). 
 Procedure  
In groups of 5-15, participants were seated in an empty classroom.  Consent forms 
were handed out and explained by a research assistant.  After consent was obtained, 
participants were handed the questionnaire and read instructions for completing it.  After 
finishing, participants turned in the questionnaire to the research assistant and were 
instructed on providing a DNA sample with a cheek swab (see Appendix C for further 
description).   
Data Analytic Plan 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was the approach used for the primary 
analyses.  SEM models relationships among latent variables and estimates random 
measurement error (Cheung & Lau, 2007; Kline, 2005).  Latent variables involve several 
observed indicator variables that are incorporated into a unified construct and also allow 
for examination of abstract, socially or psychologically created constructs that cannot be 
directly measured (Bollen, 2002).  For Research Questions 1 and 2, correlations and 
regressions among latent variables of decision making (intuitive and deliberative), socio-
emotional and cognitive control processes, age (as an observed variable), and the various 
dependent variables (some latent and some observed) were examined.  For Research 
Question 3, latent variable interactions between the independent variables (sensation 
seeking, reward sensitivity, emotional reactivity and cognitive control) and the 
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moderators (self-regulation and deviant peers) predicting risk behaviors were examined.  
To specify a latent variable interaction in Mplus, the TYPE=RANDOM command must 
be used to identify random variables (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010).  When a 
significant interaction occurred, the simple slopes were estimated using the MODEL 
CONSTRAINT command. This command allows new parameters to be defined.  The 
simple slopes were defined as the main effect + the interaction effect at one standard 
deviant above or below the moderator.   
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses  
Descriptive statistics of study variables are given in Table 1. See Appendix B for 
frequencies of categorical variables. Correlations among latent and single item study 
variables are given in Table 2.  Correlations showed that deliberative decision making 
was positively correlated with self-regulation, resistance to peer influence, future 
orientation, and age and negatively correlated with sensation seeking, deviant peers, 
general risk, delinquency, substance use, and smoking. Intuitive decision making was 
positively correlated with emotional reactivity, future orientation, and resistance to peer 
influence but not to any other variables at the bivariate level. Results of regressions with 
demographic variables predicting study variables are shown in Table 3. Generally, Asian 
participants were less likely than other race/ethnicities to engage in risk behaviors. 
Individuals who lived in a Greek house or off-campus with roommates were more likely 
than those living elsewhere to engage in risk behavior. Women were more likely to 
engage in both types of decision making, had higher emotional reactivity, future 
orientation, resistance to peer influence and self-regulation whereas men were more 
likely to engage in risk behaviors, had higher levels of sensation seeking and reward 
sensitivity.  
Measurement of socio-emotional and cognitive control processes. For socio-
emotional processing, the model did not converge with the three scales (sensation 
seeking, reward sensitivity, and emotional reactivity) as indicators or as a higher-order 
factor with the three scales as intermediate factors.  The model was then tested with two 
indicators of emotional reactivity (based on the scales scores of the AIM and Mood 
53 
 
 
 
Survey, respectively). This model converged, but sensation seeking did not load 
significantly onto the latent socio-emotional factor.  When sensation seeking was 
removed, reward sensitivity no longer loaded onto the latent factor.  Therefore, in order 
to test the remaining hypotheses, the three indicators of the socio-emotional system were 
modeled as separate latent variables in the primary analyses (Figure 5a-c). 
For cognitive control (Figure 6), punishment sensitivity did not load onto the 
latent variable, perhaps because the constructs involved in punishment sensitivity are not 
deliberative in nature.  The three remaining indicators, self-regulation, resistance to peer 
influence, and future orientation loaded significantly as scale scores onto a latent 
cognitive control variable which was used in the primary analyses.  However, the model 
is just identified so no fit statistics are available.  See Table 4 for all CFA results 
including fit statistics and added correlated errors of final measures and latent factors. 
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Table 1.  
Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Deliberative decision 
making 
3.75 .48 2.10 5.00 -.13 .01 
Intuitive decision 
making 
3.41 .47 1.60 5.00 -.39 1.12 
Sensation seeking 3.63 .71 1.17 5.00 -.36 .26 
Reward sensitivity 2.88 .49 1.50 4.30 .00 .13 
Emotional reactivity 3.68 .53 2.31 5.38 .39 -.07 
Future orientation 4.04 .53 2.27 5.00 -.42 -.12 
Resistance to peer 
influence 
2.97 .46 1.40 4.00 -.38 .25 
Self-regulation 3.71 .45 2.40 5.00 .52 .51 
Deviant peers 2.29 .66 1.00 4.36 .48 -.02 
Delinquency (square 
root) 
.36 .36 .00 1.45 .84 .21 
Tobacco use (square 
root) 
.72 .89 .00 9.00 .89 -.56 
Cigarette use 1.77 2.84 .00 9.00 1.54 1.02 
Alcohol use 4.35 2.87 .00 9.00 -.26 -1.45 
Drunk driving (square 
root) 
.46 .73 .00 2.83 1.39 .82 
Marijuana use (square 
root) 
.83 1.07 .00 3.00 .87 -.73 
Number of sexual 
partners 
2.73 1.62 .00 5.00 .31 -1.51 
Lack of condom use 2.21 1.38 1.00 5.00 .82 -.70 
Age 19.25 1.33 17.00 24.0 1.05 .61 
  
 
 
Table 2. 
 
Correlations among Latent and Single Item Study Variables. 
 
 2 
 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Deliberative 
decision making 
-.06 -.33** .00 .06 .58** .14* .63** -.29** .15* -.34** -.22** -.35** -.14* -.10 -.10 -.08 .02 .02 
2. Intuitive 
decision making 
- .12 .12 .14* .22* .15* .06 -.04 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.07 .08 -.01 .03 -.14* .09 .09 
3. Sensation 
seeking 
 - .32** -.01 -.08 -.03 -.08 .38** -.22** .45** .34** .41** .21* .20* .24** .08 -.04 -.02 
4. Reward 
sensitivity 
  - .26** .07 -.35** -.18* .37** .01 .40** .25** .42** .26** .26** .14* .30** .12 .03 
5. Emotional 
reactivity 
   - -.01 -.24** -.27** .01 -.07 -.03 -.11* -.01 .01 -.12* -.03 .02 .02 -.02 
6. Future 
orientation 
    - .23** .63** -.14* -.01 -.14* -.04 -.17* -.07 -.04 -.10 -.16* .04 .02 
7. Resistance to 
peer infl. 
     - .53** -.11 .11 -.12 -.09 -.23* -.04 -.09 -.04 -.13* .02 .04 
8. Self-
regulation 
      - -.18* .08 -.22** -.05 -.31** -.13* -.05 -.16* -.21** -.05 -.05 
9. Deviant peers        - .00 .84** .66** .65** .53** .63** .50** .68** .34** .07 
10. Age         - .09 .07 -.09 .01 .08 .12* .03 .20** .04 
11. Risk          - - - - - - - - - 
12. Substance 
use 
          - .43** - - - - .31** .05 
13. Smoking            - .30** .32** .43** .08 .09 .18* 
14. Alcohol use             - - .41** .41** .23** -.04 
15. Drunk 
driving 
             - .28** .28** .17* .01 
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Note:  *p < .05, **p < .001.  Correlations between latent variables and their indicators were not included.
16. Marijuana 
use 
              - .47** .11 .04 
17.Delinquecy                - .17* -.12 
18. # partners                 - .22** 
19. Lack of 
condom use 
                 - 
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Note:  *p < .05, **p < .001. 
Table 3.  
Standardized Results of Demographic Regressions 
 Race (dummy coded – 
Whites are reference group) 
Residence (dummy coded – On-campus 
is reference group) 
    
Variable Black/Latino/
Biracial 
Asian Greek 
House 
Off-
campus  
Off-campus 
with family 
Sex Parent 
Education 
Parent  
Occupation 
Family 
Income 
Deliberative DM .10 .05 .09 .02 .18* .13* .09 .08 .01 
Intuitive DM .01 -.07 .06 -.01 -.12 .23** .05 -.07 .02 
Sensation seeking -.17* .00 -.02 -.09 -.17* -.17* -.11 -.04 .06 
Reward sensitivity -.15 .08 .08 -.05 -.01 -.26* -.07 .12 .05 
Emotional reactivity .00 .18** -.07 -.10 -.07 .11* .08 .04 -.15* 
Future orientation .00 -.10 .14* .10 .00 .32** .09 .00 .00 
Resistance to peer influence .12 -.12 .11 .11 .09 .12* .16* -.13 -.11 
Self-regulation .00 -.14* .14* .12 .10 .15* .05 .00 .03 
Deviant peers -.06 -.19** .16* .14* -.04 -.20** -.08 -.07 .06 
Risk -.07 -.21** .29** .28** .01 -.19* -.07 -.02 .08 
Substance use -.09 -.21** .32** .26** -.04 -.07 -.04 -.04 .13* 
Delinquency .00 .02 .24* .01 -.11** -.28** -.09 .04 -.03 
Smoking -.11** -.10 .10* .17* .08 -.13* -.09 .02 .00 
Alcohol Use -.09 -.21** .32** .27** -.04 -.05 -.04 -.05 .15* 
Drunk driving -.10* -.15** .15* .28** -.01 -.09 .01 -.08 .02 
Marijuana use .04 -.13* .22** .14* .08 -.18** -.01 .00 .10 
Other drug use -.09* -.08* .06 .15* .06 -.15* -.01 .04 -.03 
# partners .08 .07 -.17* .19* .27** .03 -.13 .07 -.11 
Condom use .02 -.14 -.13* .09 .08 .06 -.03 .06 -.02 
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Figures 5a-c. Confirmatory factor analysis results of socio-emotional system constructs 
 
Figure 5a. Confirmatory factor analysis results of emotional reactivity 
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Figure 5b. Confirmatory factor analysis results of reward sensitivity 
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Figure 5c. Confirmatory factor analysis results of sensation seeking 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Confirmatory factor analysis results of cognitive control  
 
 
  
 
 
Table 4. 
Results of Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
Scale χ2 df CFI RMSEA SRMR Stndrd Factor 
Loadings 
Correlated Errors Added   
Deliberative 
Decision Making 
45.28 27 .97 .04 .04 .45-.62* Think through decisions WITH Think before act;  
Clear reasons for decisions WITH Think before act 
Intuitive Decision 
Making 
 
61.13 31 .95 .05 .04 .29-.68* Rely on feelings WITH Feelings important in decisions; 
Instincts decide action WITH Not rely intuition decs (r); 
Not rely intuition decs(r)WITH Foolish make decs feelings(r); 
Instincts decide action WITH Listen to deep feelings; 
Sensation Seeking 
 
23.34 7 .98 .08 .03 .45-.88* Like wild parties WITH Do crazy things for fun; 
Like wild parties WITH Try anything once; 
Reward Sensitivity 
 
72.73 33 .91 .06 .05 .18-.68* Obtain $$ strong motivator WITH Motivated by quick gains; 
Seek praise WITH Seek affection; 
Emotional 
Reactivity 
 
62.98 23 .94 .07 .05 .12-88* Sad movies deeply touching WITH Affected by others hurt; 
Sad movies deeply touching WITH If excited, share feelings; 
Less variable moods than friends WITH Not moody as others; 
Less variable moods than friends WITH Consistent moods; 
Resistance to Peer 
Influence  
64.02 34 .95 .05 .04 .21-.67* More important to be individual rather than with crowd WITH 
Better to be individual than make others angry; 
Self-Regulation 
 
200.17 100 .92 .05 .05 .34-.69* Track progress of goals WITH Set goals and track progress; 
Only make mistakes once WITH Don’t learn from mistake (r); 
Hard to set goals (r) WITH Trouble plans to reach goals (r); 
Realize effects of actions too late (r)WITH Don’t notice 
actions someone points out (r); 
Future Orientation 
 
73.03 31 .95 .06 .04 .44-.76* Think about things in future WITH  How often think of plans; 
Achieve goals worth effort WITH How likely achieve goals; 
Achieve goals worth effort WITH Effect of personal effort; 
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How often think about plans WITH Collect info about plans; 
Deviant Peers 
 
113.15 31 .94 .08 .05 .37-.80* 
 
Frnds used non-prescrip drugs WITH Frnds used other drugs;  
Friends unprotected sex WITH Friends has multiple partners; 
Friends stole WITH Friends hit others; 
Friends cheat on tests WITH Friends encourage law-breaking;    
General Risk 
(without drug use 
and ever had sex) 
40.38 14 .96 .07 .04 .19-.77*  
Substance Use 
(without drug use) 
32.44 14 .99 .06 .04 .33-.97*  
Alcohol Use 
 
2.94 2 1.00 .04 .01 .58-.97*  
Note: * p < .05. Results are estimated with maximum likelihood with robust standard errors.
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Primary Analyses 
For the primary analyses, SEMs were estimated to determine the structural paths 
among latent variables of interest.  Measurement portions of the models remained the 
same as described in the Measures section except that one factor loading in each measure 
was fixed to 1.0 in order to freely estimate the variance of the latent factor.  For models 
with drug use as the dependent variable, a logistic regression was estimated whereas 
linear regressions were estimated for all continuous dependent variables.  
Research Question 1.  Research Question 1 asked about the relations between 
neurobiological processes and dual-process decision making models as well as the 
relations between decision making and age. To test Hypothesis 1, the relation between 
the three latent socio-emotional variables and latent intuitive decision making were 
estimated.  The covariance (unstandardized path coefficient) was not significant for 
sensation seeking (b = .12, SE = .06, p = .06), reward sensitivity (b= .01, SE = .01, p = 
.12), or emotional reactivity (b = .01, SE = .01, p = .07); thus Hypothesis 1 was not 
supported.  It should be noted that the relatively low factor loadings for some of these 
measures may indicate poor measurement of the constructs. For Hypothesis 2, the 
covariance between the latent cognitive control processes and latent deliberative decision 
making was significant (b = .29, SE = .03, p < .001), suggesting that individuals who 
scored higher on cognitive control measures also tended to engage in deliberative 
decision making.  Hypothesis 2 was supported.  For Hypothesis 3, the covariance 
between latent intuitive and deliberative decision making and age were each examined.  
Age was not related to intuitive decision making (b = -.03, SE = .06, p = .57) but was 
related to deliberative decision making (b = .14, SE = .06, p < .05), suggesting that older 
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individuals were more likely to engage in deliberative decision making, partially 
supporting Hypothesis 3.  
Research Question 2. For Hypotheses 4a and 4b the relations between latent 
intuitive and latent deliberative decision making (separately) and risk behavior were 
tested in a regression format so that the demographic variables could be included as 
controls on risk behavior.  As described above, each type of risk behavior and the latent 
general risk behavior variable were used as dependent variables.  Intuitive decision 
making was not related to any of the risk behaviors, so Hypothesis 4b was not supported.  
Figure 7 depicts the relation between latent intuitive decision making and latent general 
risk behavior. For ease of interpretation, in the figure, only the estimate for the 
relationship between the two latent variables is shown, excluding the factor loadings and 
correlated errors.  In the regressions including deliberative decision making, decision 
making was related to less general risk behavior as well as lower levels of all the other 
risk indicators except for the two sexual risk taking items (lack of condom use and 
number of sexual partners), partially supporting Hypothesis 4a.  See Figure 8 for the 
relation between deliberative decision making and general risk behavior and Table 5 for a 
summary of model results. 
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Figure 7. Structural model of intuitive decision making and risk behavior.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *p < .05 **p < .001.  Factor loadings are all significant. The range of estimates and fit 
statistics are provided in Table 4. 
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Figure 8. Deliberative decision making and risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *p < .05 **p < .001.  Factor loadings are all significant. The range of estimates and fit 
statistics are provided in Table 4. 
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Table 5.  
Summary of the Relations between Decision Making Process and Risk 
Path Correlation 
 
Standard Error 
Intuitive decision making → General risk .01 .06 
Intuitive decision making → Substance use .00 .06 
Intuitive decision making → Alcohol use -.03 .05 
Intuitive decision making → Drug use -.14 
(odds ratio= .31) 
.02 
Intuitive decision making → Marijuana use -.04 .06 
Intuitive decision making → Cigarette Use .07 .06 
Intuitive decision making → Delinquency -.02 .07 
Intuitive decision making → Lack of Condom Use .09 .07 
Intuitive decision making → # partners .08 .07 
Deliberative decision making → General risk -.27** .06 
Deliberative decision making → Substance use -.25** .06 
Deliberative decision making → Alcohol use -.16* .05 
Deliberative decision making → Drug use -.19* 
(odds ratio=.36) 
.09 
Deliberative decision making → Marijuana use -.19* .06 
Deliberative decision making → Cigarette Use -.19* .06 
Deliberative decision making → Delinquency -.24** .06 
Deliberative decision making → Lack of Condom 
Use 
-.06 .07 
Deliberative decision making → # partners -.10 .07 
Note: *p < .05 **p < .001.   
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Research Question 3. Research Question 3 involved the role of self-regulation in 
moderating the relations between socio-emotional processes and risk behavior and the 
role of deviant peers in moderating the relations between socio-emotional and cognitive 
control processes and risk behavior.   
 The moderating role self-regulation. For Hypothesis 5, an interaction between 
latent self-regulation and each latent socio-emotional variable was tested to assess the 
moderating effect of self-regulation on the relations between socio-emotional processes 
and risk behavior.  For the models with sensation seeking as the independent variable, 
four significant interactions emerged:  predicting overall risk behavior (b = -1.13, SE = 
.48, p < .05), substance use (b = -.21, SE = .10, p < .05), delinquency (b = -.10, SE = .03, 
p < .01), and smoking (b = -1.21, SE = .60, p < .05).  Analysis of the simple slopes for 
latent risk behavior, substance use, and smoking revealed that higher levels of sensation 
seeking were related to more risk behavior at both high and low levels of self-regulation, 
but this was especially true at lower levels of self- regulation (See Table 6 for estimates).  
For delinquency, the simple slope pattern was similar.  More sensation seeking was 
related to higher levels of delinquency at lower levels of self-regulation but unrelated at 
higher levels of self-regulation. Figure 9a shows the path diagram of the interaction with 
both simple effects and the interaction path.  The measurement models and controls are 
not shown.  Figure 9b shows the pattern of the interaction in which individuals with 
higher sensation seeking and lower self-regulation are more likely to engage in 
delinquent behaviors.  The slope of the line depicting lower self-regulation is positive and 
significant; the slope for higher self-regulation is non-significant (see Table 6 for 
estimates).  The simple effect of sensation seeking was significant in each model except it 
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did not predict lack of condom use or number of sexual partners; the simple effect of self-
regulation was also significant such that higher levels of self-regulation predicted lower 
levels of general risk behavior, substance use, smoking, marijuana use, and delinquency.  
See Table 6 for full results. 
When reward sensitivity and emotional reactivity were the independent variables, 
only one interaction, reward sensitivity by self-regulation predicting delinquency, was 
significant (b = -.25, SE = .10, p < .05).  The pattern was that higher reward sensitivity 
was related to more delinquency for those with lower self-regulation (b = .19, SE = .07, p 
< .05) but not for those with higher self-regulation (b = -.05, SE = .03, p = .11) (similar to 
Figures 9a and 9b).  The simple effect of reward sensitivity was positively related to risk 
behaviors except for drug use, lack of condom use, and number of sexual partners.  The 
simple effect of self-regulation in the model with reward sensitivity was negative and 
significant for general risk behavior, marijuana use, substance use, smoking, and 
delinquency.  
The simple effect of emotional reactivity was not significant for any risk 
behaviors whereas the simple effect of self-regulation when in the model with emotional 
reactivity was negative and significant for all risk behaviors except the sexual risk taking 
items.  Hypothesis 5 was partially supported, and the interaction that was significant was 
in the expected direction, which showed that the relation between reward sensitivity and 
delinquency was positive at low levels of self-regulation and non-significant at high 
levels of self-regulation.  In other words, self-regulation buffered the effect of reward 
sensitivity on delinquency.  See Table 6 for full results. 
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Table 6. 
Summary of Results for Interactions between Latent Self-Regulation and Socio-Emotional  
 
Variables  
 
Sensation 
seeking X self-
regulation 
Simple effect of 
sensation 
seeking (SE) 
Simple effect 
of self-reg (SE) 
Interaction 
(SE) 
Simple slope 
at high self-
reg (SE) 
Simple slope at 
low self-reg 
(SE) 
General Risk 1.84(.39)** -1.14(.31)** -1.13(.47)* 1.21(.38)* 2.08(.50)** 
Substance 
Use 
.38(.06)** -.22(.06)** -.21(.10)* .29(.07)** .48(.09)** 
Alcohol use .25(.05)** -.08(.05) -.05(.08) - - 
Delinquency .05(.02)* -.05(.02)* -.09(.03)* .01(.01) .09(.03)* 
Cigarette Use 1.85(.35)** -.80(.34)* -1.21(.60)* 1.29(.42)* 2.41(.46)** 
Marijuana 
Use 
.55(.12)** -.52(.13)** -.38(.22) - - 
Other Drug 
Use 
1.83(.53)* -.77(.54) -.64(1.00) - - 
Lack of 
Condom 
.32(.20)* -.16(.20) .57(.34) - - 
# Partners .42(.22) -.23(.22) -.14(.37) - - 
Reward 
sensitivity X 
self-regulation 
Simple effect of 
reward 
sensitivity (SE) 
Simple effect 
of self-reg (SE) 
Interaction 
(SE) 
Simple slope 
at high self-
reg (SE) 
Simple slope at 
low self-reg 
(SE) 
General Risk 2.00(.69)* -1.05(.32)* -1.56(.94) - - 
Substance 
Use 
.37(.13)* -.21(.06)* -.30(.21) - - 
Alcohol use .24(.10)* -.05(.05) -.02(.17) - - 
Delinquency .06(.03)* -.03(.01)* -.17(.07)* -.02(.02) .14(.05)* 
Cigarette Use 2.07(.80)* -.72(.35)* -1.58(1.29) - - 
Marijuana 
Use 
.60(.26)* -.49(.13)** -.79(.45) - - 
Other Drug 
Use 
1.40(.89) -.88(.47) -1.17(1.68) - - 
Lack of 
Condom 
.27(.41) -.23(.20) 1.04(.80) - - 
# Partners .61(.48) -.25(.23) .37(.81) - - 
Emotional 
reactivity X self-
regulation 
Simple effect of 
emot reactivity 
(SE) 
Simple effect 
of self-reg (SE) 
Interaction 
(SE) 
Simple slope 
at high self-
reg (SE) 
Simple slope at 
low self-reg 
(SE) 
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General Risk .43(.47) -1.16(.35)* -.07(.93) - - 
Substance 
Use 
.08(.10) -.23(.07)* -.01(.20) - - 
Alcohol use -.04(.08) -.11(.05)* .02(.16) - - 
Delinquency -.01(.02) -.05(.02)* -.01(.04) - - 
Cigarette Use .49(.58) -.68(.37)* -.45(1.16) - - 
Marijuana 
Use 
.20(.21) -.53(.14)* -.40(.42) - - 
Other Drug 
Use 
1.18(.73) -1.05(.45)* 1.43(1.59) - - 
Lack of 
Condom 
.07(.33) -.22(.21) .54(.67) - - 
# Partners .39(.38) -.20(.24) 1.52(.84) - - 
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Figure 9a. Path diagram for interaction between latent sensation seeking and self-
regulation predicting delinquency 
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Note: Slope for those with higher self-regulation is non-significant. High self-regulation 
and sensation seeking was defined as 1 standard deviation above the mean and low self-
regulation and sensation seeking was 1 standard deviation below the mean. 
 
Figure 9b. Graph for simple slopes depicting the interaction between sensation seeking 
and self-regulation predicting delinquency.  
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The moderating role of deviant peers. Hypothesis 6 stated that having deviant 
peers would moderate the relations between socio-emotional processes and risk behavior 
as well as cognitive control and risk behavior.  With sensation seeking as the independent 
variable, there was a significant interaction between sensation seeking and deviant peers 
for general risk behaviors (b = .1.01, SE = .32, p < .01), delinquency (b = .10. SE = .01, p 
< .001), substance use (b = .18, SE =.07, p < .05), marijuana use (b = .49, SE = .16, p < 
.05), and smoking (b = 1.97, SE = .46, p < .001).  Examination of simple slopes indicated 
that sensation seeking was positively related to general risk behavior for those with more 
deviant peers but there was no significant relationship for those with fewer deviant peers 
(See Figures 10a and 10b).  A similar pattern was found for substance use, marijuana use, 
and smoking.  Simple slopes in the model predicting delinquency showed that there was a 
stronger positive relationship between sensation seeking and delinquency for those with 
more deviant peers than for those with fewer deviant peers.  Overall, deviant peers 
exacerbated the relationship between sensation seeking and risk behaviors.  Furthermore, 
the simple effect of deviant peers was positively related to all risk behaviors except lack 
of condom use, and the simple effect of sensation seeking was positively related to 
general risk behaviors, delinquency, substance use, marijuana use and smoking.   See 
Table 6 for full results. 
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Figure 10a. Path diagram for latent interaction between sensation seeking and deviant 
peers predicting risk behavior 
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Note: Slope for those with lower deviant peers is non-significant. High deviant peers and 
sensation seeking was defined as 1 standard deviation above the mean and low deviant 
peers and sensation seeking was 1 standard deviation below the mean. 
 
Figure 10b. Graph for simple slopes depicting the interaction between sensation seeking 
and self-regulation predicting delinquency.  
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Regarding the relation between reward sensitivity and risk behavior, there was a 
significant interaction between reward sensitivity and deviant peers predicting alcohol 
use (b = -.23, SE = .11, p < .05) and smoking (b = 2.00, SE = 1.01, p < .05).  Examination 
of simple slopes showed a positive relation between reward sensitivity and smoking for 
adolescents with higher deviant peer affiliation, but more alcohol use for those with lower 
deviant peer affiliation.  The models predicting delinquency and marijuana use never 
converged so those results are not included.  The simple effect of deviant peers was 
positive and significant for all risk behaviors (although estimates were not available for 
delinquency and marijuana use) and reward sensitivity was positive and significant for 
general risk behavior.  See Table 6 for full results.   
With emotional reactivity as the independent variable, only one interaction 
emerged: the interaction between emotional reactivity and deviant peers predicted 
delinquency (b = - .08, SE = .04, p < .05).  For individuals with fewer deviant peers, 
higher emotional reactivity was not related to delinquency (b = .05, SE = .03, p > .05), 
whereas for those with more deviant peers, higher emotional reactivity was related to 
more delinquency (b = .07, SE = .03, p < .05), similar to Figure 10b. The simple effect of 
deviant peers was once again related to all dependent variables, whereas emotional 
reactivity was not related to any.   
Finally, the interaction between cognitive control and deviant peers was tested.  
Deviant peers moderated the relationship between cognitive control and risk behavior (b 
= -.39, SE = .16, p < .05) substance use (b = -.07, SE = .03, p < .05), marijuana use (b = -
.22, SE = .09, p < .05), and delinquency (b = -.06, SE = .01, p < .001).  For general risk, 
substance use and marijuana use the analysis of the simple slopes showed that more 
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cognitive control was related to less use for those with more deviant peers and there was 
no relationship between cognitive control and risk for those with fewer deviant peers. For 
delinquency, more cognitive control was related to less delinquency for those with more 
deviant peers, but positively related to delinquency for those with fewer deviant peers.  
The simple effect of cognitive control was negatively related to general risk, substance 
use, marijuana use and delinquency whereas the simple effect of deviant peers was 
positively related to all risk behaviors. See Table 6 for full results. 
In summary, Hypothesis 6 regarding the moderating effect of deviant peers on the 
socio-emotional and cognitive control systems was partially supported.  When in models 
with socio-emotional processes, deviant peers exacerbated the positive effect of socio-
emotional constructs on risk behavior. The models with cognitive control showed that for 
those with more deviant peers cognitive control was negatively related to risk.  Having 
fewer deviant peers, however, was related to a positive relationship between cognitive 
control and delinquency. 
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Table 7. 
Summary of Results for Interactions between Latent Deviant Peer Affiliation and  
 
Neurobiological Systems  
 
Sensation 
seeking X 
deviant peers 
Simple effect of 
Sensation 
seeking (SE) 
Simple effect 
of deviant 
peers (SE) 
Interaction 
(SE) 
Simple slope 
at high dev 
peers (SE) 
Simple slope at 
low dev peers 
(SE) 
General Risk 1.03(.28)** 2.16(.38)** 1.01(.32)* 1.81(.45)** .26(.27) 
Substance 
Use 
.19(.05)** .43(.05)** .18(.07)* .33(.08)** .06(.06) 
Alcohol use .10(.05) .29(.04)** -.06(.05) - - 
Delinquency .04(.00)** .04(.00)** .10(.01)** .11(.01)** .04(.00)** 
Cigarette Use 1.38(.35)** 1.77(.26)** 1.97(.46)** 2.90(.58)** -.14(.41) 
Marijuana 
Use 
.25(.12) .90(.10)** .49(.16)* .63(.19)* -.13(.14) 
Other Drug 
Use 
.94(.83) 2.71(.60)** .53(1.26) - - 
Lack of 
Condom 
.23(.21) .29(.20) .32(.39) - - 
# Partners .13(.23) .92(.24)** -.07(.41) - - 
Reward 
sensitivity X 
deviant peers 
Simple effect of 
Reward sens  
(SE) 
Simple effect 
of deviant 
peers (SE) 
Interaction 
(SE) 
Simple slope 
at high dev 
peers (SE) 
Simple slope at 
low dev peers 
(SE) 
General Risk .71(.48) 2.35(.43)* .54(.56) - - 
Substance 
Use 
.06(.09) .47(.05)** .05(.12) - - 
Alcohol use .02(.08) .31(.04)** -.23(.11)* -.15(.11) .20(.11)* 
Delinquency - - - - - 
Cigarette Use 1.27(.72) 1.91(.28)** 2.00(1.01)* 2.81(1.31)* -.27(.73) 
Marijuana 
Use 
- - - - - 
Other Drug 
Use 
-1.07(1.25) 2.97(.61)** 3.55(2.01)   
Lack of 
Condom 
.10(.42) .39(.21) -.78(.73) - - 
# Partners .20(.46) .91(.24)** -.07(.74) - - 
Emotional 
reactivity X 
deviant peers 
Simple effect of 
Emot reactivity 
(SE) 
Simple effect 
of deviant 
peers (SE) 
Interaction 
(SE) 
Simple slope 
at high dev 
peers (SE) 
Simple slope at 
low dev peers 
(SE) 
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General Risk .41(.37) 2.45(.44)** -.32(.47) - - 
Substance 
Use 
.07(.07) .48(.05)** -.05(.10) - - 
Alcohol use -.06(.06) .31(.04)** -.10(.09) - - 
Delinquency -.01(.01) .07(.02)** -.08(.04)* .07(.03)* .05(.03) 
Cigarette Use .34(.49) 2.13(.27)** -1.69(.71) - - 
Marijuana 
Use 
.21(.17) .97(.12)** .24(.24) - - 
Other Drug 
Use 
1.87(1.36) 3.05(.58)** -.32(1.67) - - 
Lack of 
Condom 
.05(.45) .37(.19)* .10(.55) - - 
# Partners .20(.35) .91(.22)** .25(.59) - - 
Cognitive 
control X 
deviant peers 
Simple effect of 
Cog control 
(SE) 
Simple effect 
of deviant 
peers (SE) 
Interaction 
(SE) 
Simple slope 
at high dev 
peers (SE) 
Simple slope at 
low dev peers 
(SE) 
General Risk -.31(.12)* 2.34(.42)** -.39(.16)* -.61(.19)* -.02(.13) 
Substance 
Use 
-.05(.02)* .47(.05)** -.07(.03)* -.10(.03)* .00(.03) 
Alcohol use .01(.02) .30(.04)** .01(.03) - - 
Delinquency -.04(.00)** .05(.00)** -.06(.01)** -.09(.01)** .01(.00)** 
Cigarette Use -.14(.14) 2.06(.27)** -.31(.20)   
Marijuana 
Use 
-.17(.06)* .92(.12)** -.22(.09)* -.34(.10)* -.02(.07) 
Other Drug 
Use 
-.13(.36) 3.04(.57)** -.41(.50) - - 
Lack of 
Condom 
.06(.09) .31(.19)* .10(.17) - - 
# Partners -.01(.10) 1.13(.28)** .01(.22) - - 
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Summary of primary results.  Deliberative decision making was positively 
related to cognitive control and age and negatively related to many risk behaviors. 
Intuitive decision making was not related to socio-emotional processes, age, or risk 
behaviors. Self-regulation moderated some of the relations between socio-emotional 
processes and risk behavior showing that higher self-regulation was protective against the 
negative influences of socio-emotional variables. Having deviant peers was a consistently 
strong predictor of risk behavior and having more deviant peers exacerbated the relations 
between the socio-emotional system and risk behavior.  Having more deviant peers also 
strengthened the negative relations between cognitive control and risk behavior.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
 The primary purpose of the current study was to further explore the relation 
between decision making and risk behavior among college students.  First, the overlap 
between more traditional dual-process decision making models and constructs described 
as part of the neurobiological model of adolescent decision making and risk-taking was 
examined.  Specifically, analyses examined the relations between intuitive decision 
making and socio-emotional processing as well as deliberative decision making and 
cognitive control processing.  Furthermore, the relationship between age and each 
decision making process was assessed to determine if there might be a developmental 
aspect to dual-process models, which to date have generally lacked a developmental 
focus.  Previous investigations into age differences of decision making have tended to 
focus on specific heuristics, fallacies, and cognitive abilities.  The present research also 
attempted to strengthen the neurobiological model by incorporating real-world risk 
behaviors and by identifying individual difference factors that may moderate the relations 
between the constructs relating to the socio-emotional and cognitive control systems of 
the neurobiological model and risk behaviors.  In general, support was found linking 
cognitive control processes and deliberative decision making to each other and also to 
risk behaviors, consistent with hypotheses. However, intuitive decision making was not 
related to socio-emotional variables or risk behaviors, not supporting hypotheses.  
Furthermore, self-regulation and deviant peers moderated the relations between 
neurobiological systems and risk behaviors. 
Research Question 1: Associations between Neurobiological Systems and Dual-
processes 
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 The first research question was whether dual-process decision making models and 
the neurobiological theory could be related.  The current study found that measures of 
deliberative decision making and cognitive control system variables (self-regulation, 
future orientation, and resistance to peer influence) were indeed related.  This was 
expected because the deliberative process of dual-process decision making models and 
the cognitive control system of the neurobiological theory both refer to more analytical, 
logical, computational, decision making (Kahneman, 2003; Klaczynski, 2005; Steinberg, 
2008).  Previous research has shown that, in terms of cognitive abilities, such as logical 
reasoning, adolescents were similar to adults, suggesting that development of cognitive 
abilities is generally complete by mid-adolescence (Steinberg, 2007). So it is important to 
distinguish deliberative decision making, which involves some regulatory capacity, from 
concepts like abstract reasoning abilities.  If maturation of the prefrontal cortex underlies 
cognitive control development, perhaps it also underlies the development of deliberative 
decision making.  Conceptualization of the neurobiological model should include 
deliberative decision making.      
The results also provided information on the components of cognitive control. 
Cognitive control was comprised of three constructs: self-regulation, future orientation, 
and resistance to peer influence. To my knowledge, these have not been previously 
related to deliberative decision making.  The ability to control one’s behaviors, emotions, 
and attention in order to meet one’s goals, to make complex plans for the future, and to 
resist friends’ potentially negative influences help a person make good decisions. 
Punishment sensitivity was originally hypothesized to be a part of cognitive control 
because it would presumably inhibit poor decision making. However, punishment 
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sensitivity was not related to the other three constructs.  This may be due to the 
mechanism of inhibition involved in punishment sensitivity. For instance, the punishment 
sensitivity measure included items such as fear, embarrassment, and shyness.  Although 
these constructs are inhibitory, they are perhaps more representative of emotions and 
temperament than cognitive control.  The present finding is perhaps in contrast with a 
study which found that attentiveness to punishment in the context of the Iowa Gambling 
Task increased linearly with age parallel with other cognitive control constructs. In the 
present study, a paper and pencil measure was used and results indicated that it was not 
related to other cognitive control constructs.  This could be due to different types of 
measures (survey vs. behavioral) actually measuring different tendencies or it could be 
that punishment sensitivity, while related to age, should not be conceptualized as related 
to cognitive control and is instead indicative of a different developmental process, such as 
a decline in the propensities of the socio-emotional system.  So perhaps the decline in risk 
behavior in adulthood is not only because the cognitive control system has caught up with 
the socio-emotional system, but also due to a decrease of the socio-emotional system.  
 The relations between intuitive decision making and socio-emotional processing 
were also examined. None of the constructs hypothesized as part of the socio-emotional 
system was related to intuitive decision making.  Thus, it may be concluded that socio-
emotional processes and intuitive decision making do not appear to overlap.  It is possible 
that because intuitive decision making is so common for every day decisions it is not 
predictive of any particular subset of decisions whereas socio-emotional processing is 
meant to describe risky decision making in particular.  Although both the intuitive 
decision making process and socio-emotional system operate quickly and outside of 
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conscious thought (Kahneman, 2003; Klaczynski, 2005), intuitive decision making 
reflects common decision making as opposed to the socio-emotional system which 
reflects reward and novelty seeking specifically.  Therefore, it is important to keep the 
concepts of intuition and socio-emotional processing separate in research on decision 
making. 
An important point, however, is that a latent factor of socio-emotional processing 
did not materialize because the three hypothesized constructs, which were sensation 
seeking, reward sensitivity, and emotional reactivity, did not load onto a single factor.  
The issue apparently was with emotional reactivity, which was not correlated at the 
bivariate level with reward sensitivity or risk behaviors.   The items included in the 
emotional reactivity measure were meant to reflect intensity and variation in mood or 
emotions and were included because risky decisions are thought to be strongly influenced 
by emotions. It is unclear whether the fault is with the operationalization of emotional 
reactivity or the conceptualization of the role that emotions play in the socio-emotional 
system.  Perhaps emotional reactivity would have accounted for more variance and fit 
with the other measures in a younger age group when the mismatch between the socio-
emotional system and cognitive control is at its peak.   
 Also posed in Research Question 1 was whether the decision making processes 
would be related to age. Due to the cross-sectional nature of this study, change over time 
could not be addressed.  However, correlations with age did imply that older individuals 
were more likely to endorse deliberative decision making than younger individuals.  
Intuitive decision making, on the other hand, was not related to age in the present sample.  
Again, this could be because the majority of decisions are made intuitively throughout 
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adulthood.   In fact, as the number of decisions a person has to make on their own 
increases (presumably with age and experience) the intuitive decisions should perhaps 
increase out of necessity to conserve mental energy.  A mature decision maker, as defined 
by the self-regulation model of decision making, is one who knows when a decision is 
worthy of deliberation (Byrnes, 2005).  Perhaps it is not the use of intuitive processing 
that changes with age, but rather which decisions are made with the intuitive process.  
Such a relationship, of course, would not be reflected in a correlation with age.  Another 
possibility is that a college sample is too old to show changes in socio-emotional 
processing or intuitive decision making. The largest gap between the socio-emotional 
system and the cognitive control system is thought to occur earlier in adolescence 
(Steinberg, 2007; Steinberg, 2008).  Perhaps the socio-emotional system and intuitive 
processing are related earlier in adolescence.  The socio-emotional system is thought to 
develop quickly in mid-adolescence and may be fully developed and have reached a 
plateau or declined by the time individuals reach college.  
 In sum, we learned that deliberative decision making is related to, and should be 
included in conceptions of, cognitive control, and that it is related to age. Additionally, 
intuitive processing is separate from socio-emotional processing and is not related to age.   
Furthermore, the components of the socio-emotional system may need re-
conceptualization or may not be appropriate for a college-aged sample. Replication of the 
current results in other age ranges is needed to confirm or refute these claims.   
Research Question 2: Neurobiological Constructs and Risk Behavior 
 Research Question 2 concerned whether the decision making processes were 
related to risk behaviors.  Deliberative decision making was negatively related to most 
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risk behavior, suggesting that those who are more likely to think through decisions are 
less likely to decide to engage in risk behaviors.  This finding corroborates some previous 
research on the relationship between deliberative decision making and risk behaviors 
(e.g., Beyth-Marom et al., 1993; Wolff & Crockett, 2011).  This is in contrast to fuzzy 
trace theory, which has suggested that, because the likelihood of negative consequences 
is relatively low, verbatim-type processing would lead individuals to make the rational 
choice to engage in risk behavior (Reyna et al., 2005).  It is possible, and seems likely, 
that deliberative decision making involves more than weighing risk and rewards and 
choosing a course of action based only on the likelihood of a negative consequence. 
Rather, deliberative decision making would take multiple aspects of a decision into 
account, including the severity of a negative consequence and thinking about alternative 
courses of action. Intuitive decision making was not related to risk behavior, which, 
although the relation was hypothesized, is unsurprising, since it was not related to socio-
emotional processes.  This, again, is in contrast with fuzzy trace theory, which contends 
that the fuzzy, gist-based conception of the potential for a catastrophe would prevent 
someone from making the decision to engage in risk behavior.  Much of research on 
fuzzy trace decision making is on behavioral tasks where participants must decide 
whether to gamble as the probabilities of winning become less and less likely (Reyna et 
al., 2005).  So the differences in the fuzzy trace theory and the present findings may be in 
how intuitive processing is measured.  
An important exception to the relations between deliberative decision making and 
risk behavior is that the two sexual risk taking items, not using condoms and number of 
sexual partners, were unrelated to deliberative decision making.  This suggests that the 
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decision making process may be different for these items or for sexual behavior more 
broadly.  Although using condoms is the safest option (other than abstinence) to protect 
oneself against sexually transmitted infections (STIs), it is possible that a monogamous 
couple where both partners have been tested for STIs would be practicing safe sex using 
another type of contraceptive, such as birth control pills.  Furthermore, personal decision 
style may not be the same as dyadic decision making style or the partner’s decision 
making style (see also Wolff & Crockett, 2011).  A more varied and exhaustive 
assessment of sexual risk taking, such as one proposed in Turchik and Garske (2009), in 
which many more behaviors, such as sexual intent, sex while under the influence of drugs 
and alcohol, and regretted or unexpected sexual encounters are assessed, may be better 
able to determine which decision making process helps or harms young people in terms 
of sexual risk taking.  
Research Question 3: The Moderating Effect of Self-regulation and Deviant peers 
 The third research question had to do with the influence of individual and 
contextual differences in self-regulation and deviant peers on the relationship between 
socio-emotional and cognitive control processing and risk behavior.  In this study, self-
regulation had two roles: one as part of the cognitive control system that is thought to 
increase with age; the other as an individual difference variable which may make 
participants more or less susceptible to socio-emotional processes.  Self-regulation is a 
broad construct that is measureable in very early in childhood and tends to increase 
throughout childhood and adolescence (Kopp, 1982). Yet, self-regulation also shows 
stability over time. One study found that individual differences in self-regulation were 
relatively stable from ages 4 or 5 to ages 12 or 13 (Raffaelli et al., 2005). In the present 
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study, only a few interactions with self-regulation were significant. For those that were 
found, self-regulation buffered the negative effect of socio-emotional constructs on risk 
behavior as predicted.  Therefore, individual differences in self-regulation may affect the 
trajectory of the socio-emotional system. 
The relative lack of significant interactions could point to measurement issues 
with the socio-emotional processes.  The simple effect of self-regulation was generally 
significant in predicting risk behaviors, except it did not predict sexual risk taking and 
only predicted alcohol use in the model with emotional reactivity.  It is conceivable that 
drug use and delinquency are more “serious” risk behaviors that occur less among college 
students than alcohol use and sexual risk taking and therefore self-regulation may be an 
important predictor for the “serious” risk behaviors as opposed to the more “normative” 
risk behaviors like alcohol use and sexual risk taking among college students.  
 Affiliating with deviant peers was a more reliable predictor of risk behaviors, 
replicating much previous research (Brown, 2004; Hawkins et al., 1992; Dishion et al., 
1995).  Interactions between deviant peers and the neurobiological constructs were 
relatively common. Generally, there was a stronger relationship between socio-emotional 
processes and risk behavior for those who claimed to have more deviant peers.  In other 
words, deviant peers exacerbated the positive relationship between socio-emotional 
processes and risk behavior. This finding is in agreement with the neurobiological theory 
which suggests that the socio-emotional system is highly activated in the presence of 
peers.  When one’s friends are participating in deviant behaviors, individuals may be 
inclined to follow suit.  Once again the sexual risk taking outcomes were not predicted by 
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significant interactions.  Since socio-emotional processes were unrelated to those 
outcomes, it was perhaps unlikely that deviant peers would moderate that relationship.  
For cognitive control, the pattern of interactions was puzzling in some respects. 
Participants who had more deviant peers showed a negative relationship or lack of 
relationship between cognitive control and risk as predicted. However, those with fewer 
deviant peers showed a positive relationship between cognitive control and risk behavior, 
which was not expected.  For those who had more deviant friends compared to those with 
fewer, it is possible that in situations involving risk behavior, the cognitive control 
system is activated, decreasing the relationship with risk behaviors.  For those who did 
not claim to have deviant peers, the direction of the effect of cognitive control on risk 
behavior switched, becoming significant and positive.  Perhaps those with higher 
cognitive control but few deviant friends to influence them make a more conscious 
decision to engage in risk behavior, consistent with the fuzzy trace theory.  In other 
words, the idea that people make a logical decision to engage in risk behavior may only 
be true in the specific context of having fewer deviant friends.  Perhaps in the current 
sample, many individuals did not have many deviant peers or they were the instigators of 
the behavior. 
Implications 
 Theory.  The current study has important implications for several theories of 
decision making, most notably the neurobiological theory.  The cognitive control system 
and the deliberative decision making process of more traditional dual-process decision 
making theories appear to overlap considerably. They are each negatively related to risk 
behavior and positively related to each other.  The socio-emotional process of the 
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neurobiological model, however, appears separate from intuitive decision making.  
Perhaps intuitive decision making which is extremely common for all decisions would 
not pick up on socio-emotional system constructs which are theorized to relate to risky 
decisions specifically.  Also, it is possible that areas of the brain involved in cognitive 
control should also relate to deliberative decision making.  Furthermore, it is now clear 
that individual differences need to be examined and included along with developmental 
changes in research on the neurobiological theory.  This is important because researchers 
should distinguish among young people in terms of their propensity for risk behavior as 
certainly some are more at risk than others. Not all young people are taking part in risk 
behaviors and it is important to determine factors that are related to increased and 
decreased levels of risk.   
This study also has implications for the fuzzy trace theory.  The fuzzy trace theory 
has suggested that individuals who use gist-based processing are less likely to make risky 
decisions because they imagine the possibility of a catastrophe.  Although the current 
study did not directly assess gist or verbatim processing, the measures of “gist-like” 
processing (i.e., intuitive decision making) were not related to risk behaviors.  
Additionally, “verbatim-type” processing, which is more analytical, was related to less 
risk taking, not more, as hypothesized by fuzzy trace theory.  One potential reason for 
this is that most studies of fuzzy trace theory use lab tasks, such as the Iowa Gambling 
Task, and although some have shown that gambling tasks are related to real-world risk 
behavior (see Reyna & Farley, 2006; Reyna et al., 2011), there may be still be important 
differences between risk taking in the lab and real-time, real-world decision making in 
risky contexts.  One recent study combined the fuzzy trace and neurobiological theories 
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to look at risk behavior and framing effects (a classic decision making task) (Reyna et al., 
2011). Using a sample of high school and college students, measures of sensation 
seeking, behavioral inhibition, gist processing, and verbatim processing were measured.  
Results showed that once sensation seeking and behavioral inhibition were controlled, 
gist and verbatim processing still accounted for unique variance in sexual risk taking.  So 
there may be important differences in the fuzzy trace constructs and the neurobiological 
constructs such that each account for variance in adolescent and young adult risk 
behavior once the other is controlled.  Additionally, because the current study found a 
positive relationship between risk behaviors and cognitive control for those with fewer 
deviant peers, an important consideration for decision making and risk taking is the 
context in which one is making the decisions.   
The self-regulation model of decision making and other models of step-wise 
decision making (see Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1997; Byrnes, 2005) are strengthened 
by the current findings.  These theories suggest that good decision making occurs when 
one approaches a decision by following a series of steps, congruent with analyzing and 
deliberating.  If it is agreed that avoiding the risk behaviors that were assessed in this 
study constitutes a “good” decision, then better decision making is achieved by self-
regulation and deliberation in accord with these theories.  
 Application. The present findings have implications for public policy as well.  
“Understanding the [decision making capacities], and the neural underpinnings of these 
processes, should be a high priority for those interested in the physical and psychological 
well being of young people” (Steinberg, 2008, p.19-20)  Past programs intended to 
improve adolescent decision making have generally not fared well (see Steinberg, 2008).  
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According to Steinberg, the increase of cognitive control and the decrease of risk 
behavior will occur naturally with age, so rather than attempting to change how 
adolescents view or think about risky behavior, more needs to be done at the macro level 
to limit the opportunities for engaging in dangerous activities.  For example, effective 
ways to deter risk taking involve policy actions such as raising the price of cigarettes and 
limiting access to alcohol. However, the present findings suggest that if a program was 
able to effectively increase deliberative decision making, it would perhaps also help 
young people learn to make better decisions about risk behavior.  Also, improving self-
regulation would help counteract socio-emotional tendencies. The current study implies 
that we cannot completely discount programs targeted at individual decision making. 
Limitations 
 The present study should be considered in light of several limitations. First, the 
sample used was a college sample that ranged in age from 18 to 24, which may have been 
too old to provide an ideal test of the mismatch between the socio-emotional and 
cognitive control systems.  The neurobiological model states that the age at which the 
largest gap between the socio-emotional system and the cognitive control system occurs 
several years earlier; therefore the current study may have only picked up on changes in 
the cognitive control system as the socio-emotional system may have finished 
developing.   
 The study was not longitudinal so we cannot directly assess the developmental 
nature of these cognitions and behaviors.  Therefore we cannot know whether there is 
within-person change in decision making and cognitive control and if increases in 
cognitive control are related to decreases in risk behavior.   
94 
 
 
 
All measures were self-report carrying the potential for bias in participants’ 
responses and shared method variance.  Indeed there was not much variability in some of 
the risk behaviors measured, and the present findings could be strengthened by targeting 
a riskier group or using different modeling techniques to account for non-normal sample 
distributions in the analyses.  
Finally, the sample was predominantly white and all were enrolled in college. The 
findings may not be applicable to the experiences of other ethnicities and individuals who 
did not attend college after high school. Indeed the experiences of a young adult in the 
workforce are likely to be different from those of a young adult in a college setting.  The 
college environment is predisposed to exposing young people to new points of view and 
perhaps different ways of thinking. Additionally, college students may have more 
opportunities for risk behavior as they have relatively fewer responsibilities and more 
access to college-related phenomena, such as fraternity parties.  
Future Directions 
This research opens many avenues for future studies which may delve more 
deeply into the topics presented in this study.  For example, future endeavors can include 
other types of individual differences in decision making and risk behavior.  For example, 
future research on this topic should include biological aspects such as genetics and brain 
activation studies.  There are several genes that are likely to play a role in risk behavior 
and cognition, such as dopamine receptor and transporter genes.  Also, gene-environment 
interactions, which are so clearly important for understanding human behavior may help 
further untangle the issues of decision making about risk behavior.  For instance, genes 
that are associated with higher levels of reward seeking may be activated in the presence 
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of deviant peers.  These types of studies may be able to discern also whether inhibitory 
responses and analytical competence have different underlying mechanisms that could 
help further explain what prevents young people from engaging in risk behavior.   
Behavioral measures and biological measures should be included along with self-
report questionnaires.  Some examples of behavioral measures are the Tower of London, 
which assesses planning, or video games like the one presented in Gardner and Steinberg 
(2005) which may provide better assessment of risk propensities that one may not be 
aware of or choose to report in a survey.   Behavioral measures also provide the 
opportunity for studying brain activation while the participant is actually making risky 
decisions.  One example of such a study occurred when brain imaging was assessed 
during the Stoplight task video game in which participants had to choose whether to run a 
yellow light in order to get to a party as quickly as possible (as described in Gardner and 
Steinberg (2005)).   Results showed that reward valuation and social cognition areas of 
the brain were activated in decisions to stop at the red light after participants had been 
excluded by peers presumably because participants had heightened sensitivity to what 
their peers were thinking and a stronger desire for the reward that comes from impressing 
or pleasing their peers (Peake, Pfeifer, Stormshak, & Dishion, 2012).    
There may also be other individual and social differences that would moderate the 
relationship between decision making processes and risk behaviors.  For instance, 
parenting, in terms of the quality of the parent-child relationship or autonomy granting, 
affects risk behaviors such as delinquency as well as deviant peer affiliation (see Deutsch, 
Crockett, Wolff, & Russell, in press) and may also influence decision making.  A recent 
study of Chinese adolescents found that adolescents who engaged in every day decision 
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making showed improvement on the Iowa Gambling Task compared to adolescents 
whose parents made decisions for them (Xiao et al., 2011), suggesting that parental 
autonomy granting may help facilitate maturation of decision making abilities.  Similarly, 
different types of friends or differing qualities of friendship may wield different 
influences.  One study found that risk-taking was more likely after participants had been 
socially excluded during a computerized task (Peake et al., 2012).  It is also likely that 
other environmental factors such as SES, quality of school, and neighborhood quality 
may influence how young people think about the decision to engage in risk behaviors.  
Other cognitive factors may also play a role: for example, problem solving, perspective 
taking, or the ability to think abstractly may influence how an individual makes 
decisions.    
Finally, other types of decisions and other decision making styles should also be 
included.  Decisions that may be especially pertinent in late adolescence or early 
adulthood include decisions about college, careers, money, and romantic relationships.  
To fully understand the complex nature of decision making, one must look at decisions 
other than only those about risk behavior.  Also, the dual-process models presented in this 
study include the two paths of individual decision making.  However, there are other 
ways that decisions are made. For example, one may defer to another person to make 
their decisions or one may avoid making a decision altogether (Galotti, Ciner, 
Altenbaumer, Geerts, Rupp, & Woulfe, 2006).  These other types of decisions and 
decision making styles would likely have different predictors than the decision making 
processes investigated currently.   
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Conclusion 
This research has made important strides in understanding the mechanisms by 
which youth choose to engage in risk behaviors.  Specifically, deliberative decision 
making is related to increased cognitive control processing, increased age, and less risk 
behavior.  With this knowledge, we can better provide suggestions for prevention and 
policy designed to decrease risk behaviors. Future research studies should continue to 
address individual differences and translation of brain and laboratory research into real 
world problems.  Furthermore, this study has merged various literatures that inform risk 
behavior research including developmental, social, and cognitive areas. This type of 
interdisciplinary research is essential for understanding complex problems like decision 
making and risk behavior.   
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List of Items in Questionnaire 
*Indicates items used in analyses 
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Appendix B 
 
Frequencies of Categorical Variables 
Drug Use 331 (86.6%) Never done drugs 
49(12.8%) Done drugs  
Sex 143(37.4% ) Men 
239(62.6%) Women 
Race/Ethnicity 321(84%) White 
36(9.4%) Black, Latino, Biracial 
23(6.0%) Asian 
Parent 1 Education 8(2.1%) less than high school education 
66(17.3%) high school graduate 
69(18.1%) some college 
46(12.0%) Associate’s degree 
121(31.7%) Bachelor’s degree 
48(12.6%) Master’s degree 
24(6.3%) Doctoral degree 
Parent 2 Education 12(3.1%) Less than high school education 
56(14.7%) High school graduate 
55(14.4%) Some college 
40(10.5%) Associate’s degree 
113(29.6%) Bachelor’s degree 
57(14.9%) Master’s degree 
14(3.7%) Doctoral degree 
Parent 1 Occupation 29(7.6%) Day laborer, etc. 
23(6.0%) Painter, etc. 
33(8.6%) Auto mechanic, etc. 
58(15.2%) Machinist, etc. 
120(31.4%) Supervisor, etc. 
73(19.1%) Nurse, etc. 
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13(3.4%) Veterinarian, etc. 
27(7.1%) Physician, etc. 
Parent 2 Occupation 19(5.0%) Day laborer, etc. 
19(5.0%) Painter, etc. 
35(9.2%) Auto mechanic, etc. 
60(15.7%) Machinist, etc. 
78(20.4%) Supervisor, etc. 
74(19.4%) Nurse, etc. 
23(6.0%) Veterinarian, etc. 
23(6.0%) Physician, etc. 
Family Income 13(3.4%) $0-15,000 
15(3.9%) $15,000-30,000 
32(8.4%) $30,001-45,000 
46(12.0%) $45,001-60,000 
49(12.8%) $60,001-75,000 
54(14.4%) $75,001-90,000 
62(16.2%) $90,001-105,000 
97(25.4%) over $105,000 
Residence 211(55.2%) On-campus dorm or apartment 
49(12.8%) Greek House 
91(23.8%) Off-campus, with roommates or alone 
28(7.3%) With parents/guardians or other family 
Note: Parent occupation is the average of the occupations given for each parent or 
caregiver for those with two parents or caregivers.  Parent education is the average of the 
education levels given for each parent for those with two parents.  
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Appendix C 
Genetic Analyses 
 The original intent of this study was to assess genotype as an individual difference 
that may have affected the relations between the socio-emotional or cognitive control 
system and risk behavior. However, due to contamination of the DNA samples, analyses 
were not performed.  Specifically, the hypothesis stated: Dopamine is implicated in the 
reward processing and sensation seeking of the socio-emotional system, and 
polymorphisms of a dopamine receptor gene will be especially relevant to risk-taking. 
Carriers of the 7r allele of DRD4 are expected to have higher socio-emotional process 
scores.  Furthermore, the relationship between the socio-emotional process and risk 
behavior will be stronger for those with the 7r allele than for those with a different variant 
of the DRD4 gene because prior research has shown an effect of having the 7r allele on 
novelty/reward seeking and some types of risk behavior. 
This hypothesis was based on the following: Changes in the dopamine system are 
mainly developmental changes that occur in everyone, but it is also likely some these 
changes may be more pronounced in some individuals due to their genotype.  Due to the 
apparent increase of dopamine receptors, the dopamine receptor gene (DRD4) is a likely 
candidate for individual differences in changes in sensation seeking in adolescence.  For 
example, the 7-repeat (7r) allele of the DRD4 gene has been empirically linked to 
reward/novelty seeking and to some risk behaviors (Becker, Laucht, El-Faddagh, & 
Schmidt, 2005; Laucht, Becker, & Schmidt, 2006; Laucht, Becker, Blomever, & 
Schmidt, 2007; Ray, Bryan, Mackillop, McGeary, Hesterberg, & Hutchison, 2009).   
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Further review of the literature revealed other polymorphisms that may have been 
genotyped had the samples been viable: The DRD4 promoter C-521T SNP appears to 
reduce transcriptional efficiency of the DRD4 gene in the presence of the T allele, 
meaning fewer receptors are made (D’Souza et al., 2004), whereas the C allele has been 
associated with heightened sexual arousal and sexual desire and with novelty seeking 
(Ben Zion et al., 2006; Okuyama, Ishiguro, Nankai, Shibuya, Watanabe, & Arinami, 
2000).  Perhaps individuals with the C allele, who have “typical” levels of receptors 
being produced are at increased risk of having more dopamine transmission compared to 
those without a C allele during adolescence.  The catechol-o-methyl tranferase (COMT) 
val158met polymorphism may also play a role because the Met allele has been associated 
with efficient patterns of prefrontal cortical activation and superior cognitive performance 
(Rosa, Dickinson, Apud, Weinberger, & Elvevåg, 2010).  Therefore, individuals with a 
Met allele of the COMT gene may show more cognitive control. Finally, the dopamine 
transporter, DAT1 3’VNTR, which regulates neuronal dopamine transporter proteins that 
are responsible for dopamine reuptake (Bazzett, 2008) has been related to impulsivity in 
terms of delay discounting (Paloyelis, Asherson, Mehta, Faraone, & Kuntsi, 2010).  In 
sum, some individuals may be more or less protected from the increases in dopamine 
transmission during adolescence due to their genotype, and we cannot assume that brain 
changes are going to be standard across individuals. Polymorphisms in the regulatory 
regions such as BDNF or NRXN3 which are involved in neural development may be 
important when studying issues related to brain development.  
The data collection involved participants swabbing the inside of their cheeks for 1 
minute to collect a sufficient number of cells for DNA extraction.  Then they returned the 
119 
 
 
 
swab to the research assistant who, wearing latex gloves, deposited the cells into a cell 
lysis solution where they were stored.   
When all samples were collected, DNA was extracted by first isolating the DNA 
in an RNase treatment, then precipitating the protein, and finally precipitating the DNA.  
Effectively, this process separates the DNA from the rest of the cell material. After DNA 
extraction, the samples were nano-dropped, which identifies the amount DNA obtained.  
Next, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was performed on the samples, which, through 
cycles of denaturation, annealing, and extension, amplified the candidate gene of interest 
for visualization.  The amplified fragments were visualized on agarose gels with 
CybrSafe staining.  The amplification process involves using electric signals to move the 
DNA fragments through the gel.  See below for an example gel image.  
 
 
 In this gel image, the lane numbers 2-18 each identify a sample of DRD4.  The 
ladders on each end are the standards.  DRD4 is a variable number tandem repeat 
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polymorphism, which means that a sequence of 48 base pairs is repeated a certain 
number of times.  Each allele may have 2 – 11 repeats.  The higher the number of repeats, 
the larger the DNA fragment is, which means that a fragment does not move as far 
through the gel.  The lines within each lane show where the fragment stopped moving 
and thus indicates the genotype for the sample.  Sample 14 appears to have a 4-repeat 
allele and a 7-repeat allele. Samples 15 and 16 appear to have two 4-repeat alleles. 
Unfortunately, all samples contained a 4-repeat allele, which is so improbable that it 
indicates that the samples were all contaminated and the genetic data was not reliable. 
